David wrote: > A 380 approve A > A>B 28 approve AB > A>C 9 approve AC > > B 80 approve B > B>A 2 approve B > B>C 133 approve B > > C 4 approve C > C>A 13 approve AC > C>B 351 approve C > > This gives the following result in the Approval election: > > A 432 winner > B 243 > C 377 > > C is the Condorcet winner but A wins using strategy A under Approval. > > Why am I getting different results, am I applying strategy A incorrectly > or am I using different assumptions to the ones you used?
The short answer is that you're allowing the voters to adjust their votes only once. With repeated adjustments, the voters would be able to find the equilibrium A 380 approve A A>B 28 approve AB A>C 9 approve A B 80 approve B B>A 2 approve BA B>C 133 approve BC C 4 approve C C>A 13 approve C C>B 351 approve C and C would win (A 419, B 243, C 501). This is quite an interesting example, though. I'll investigate it further and get back to you again. ===== Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Free Pop-Up Blocker - Get it now http://companion.yahoo.com/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
