Balloting: Rank-balloting with Approval cutoff. Truncation & equal ranking permitted
(though they're unlikely to be needed)
1. Delete from the rankings every candidate who isn't in the Smith set.
2. If more than 1 remain, delete from the rankings every candidate who has a majority defeat,
unless all remaining do.
3. If more than 1 remain, apply Approval, electing the candidate above the most people's Approval
cutoff.
[end of Smith Majority Approval defilnition]
As with any of the best methods, this method could have the tie-drop-line option, by which the voter could indicate that, if there's a circular tie whose every member has a majority defeat, and which has members above & below that voter's tie-drop-line, that voter wants to delete from his ranking every candidate below that line. That option is no more needed with this method than with wv, NES, or DSV, but could be useful with any good method if order-reversal were regarded as a problem.
Likewise, the other anti-order-reverrsal enhancements that I've described could be useful with any good method, including this one, if order-reversal were considered a problem.
The above definition is for public elections. For committees, organizations, meetings, and polls, using the Schwartz set instead of the Smith set would be a refinement, provided that the participants accept its slightly wordier definition.
Mike Ossipoff
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