I favor version P. --- Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > The reason that the YVC methods are silly is that you can affect the > outcome of the election, but (if there are a significant number of > voters) you have no way of knowing how to vote or not-vote so as to > achieve your desired outcome.
I suggest that a vote is "counted" if the voter doesn't wish he had voted some other way. In a Plurality election, the votes for a spoiler candidate are not counted. In an IRV election: 8 A>B 5 B>A 7 C>B A wins. The C>B votes are not counted. Approval election: 55 AB (sincere preference A>B) 45 B B wins. Some portion of the 55 votes are not counted. (That seems intuitively wrong, but I'm not sure why.) Schulze or RP election: 40 A>B>C 35 B>C>A 25 C>A>B A wins. The 35 votes are not counted. By this definition, no method will be perfect, of course. Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] _________________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
