Ken Johnson wrote: > Forest Simmons wrote: -snip- > >A more fundamental goal might be to go with the choice that > >would be acceptable to the greatest number of voters. > > That sounds like Approval. The method follows directly and > obviously from the statement of the goal, no formal proof > required. -snip-
Except it's not obvious what "acceptable" means. It's not defined in the rational choice theory model of individual preferences, nor do I see how to derive it within that model. Furthermore, I see no reason to believe that "sincere acceptability" would have anything to do with the voting strategies actually employed. Each voter would have a clear incentive to approve their most preferred candidate, regardless of whether that candidate is sincerely acceptable, and would have a clear incentive to not approve their least preferred candidate, regardless of whether that candidate is sincerely acceptable, etc. --Steve ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
