On Wed, 9 Jun 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You wrote:
Tally: 1. Pairwise tally, using the ranked ballots only. Elect the Condorcet winner if one exists.
So in the examples:
45 A 100 > B 70 > C 0 10 B 100 > A 70 > C 0 5 B 100 > C 70> A 0 40 C 100 > B 70 > A 0
45 A 100 > B 10 > C 0 10 B 100 > A 90 > C 0 5 B 100 > C 90 > A 0 40 C 100 > B 10 > A 0
B wins in both cases even though in the second example B is disliked by 85% of voters.
Yup. Both are decided by plain Condorcet, which only considers rankings not ratings, and B wins. Of the methods on my Election Calculator, only IRV selects A. B is the compromise candidate. Everyone is happy enough with B.
See the first examle:
http://bolson.org:8080/v/et?vrr=-r&if=-d&cand=3&data=*45+10%2C7%2C0%0D%0A*10+7%2C10%2C0%0D%0A*5+0%2C10%2C7%0D%0A*40+0%2C7%2C10
In your second example, B being devalued and B-voters throwing in more with A, IRNR picks this up and selects A (rank-only methods other than IRV still choose B):
http://bolson.org:8080/v/et?vrr=-r&if=-d&cand=3&data=*45+10%2C1%2C0%0D%0A*10+9%2C10%2C0%0D%0A*5+0%2C10%2C9%0D%0A*40+0%2C1%2C10
Brian Olson http://bolson.org/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
