Hi Andrew,
On Nov 1, 2004, at 1:27 PM, Andrew Myers wrote:
I thought people might be interested to know about some recent improvements to the Condorcet Internet Voting Service at http://www5.cs.cornell.edu/~andru/civs.
* It now implements three different completion rules, including MAM, Beatpath Winner, and a deterministic variant of MAM.
I presume this"deterministic variant " is what you call CIVS Ranked Pairs:
http://www5.cs.cornell.edu/~andru/civs/rp.html
The major difference between CIVS Ranked Pairs and MAM is the rule on when to keep a preference. A preference is kept exactly when it does not create any new cycles when considered in conjunction with strictly stronger, kept preferences. Thus, preferences of equal strength may be kept even though in conjunction they produce a new cycle, as long as individually they do not.
This sounds to me that Same-Sized Majorities with no other differentiators will lead to cycles, and CIVS specifies no mechanism for breaking that, and is thus incomplete. Is that correct?
-- Ernie P.
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