At 2004-11-29 06:39 Monday, Diana Galletly wrote: >On Mon, 29 Nov 2004, Craig Carey wrote: .... >newsgroups are not accessible (much) beyond the boundaries of the University; >but in any case they are ucam.*, not cam.*. cam.* is for the wider population >of Cambridge and Cambridgeshire. ...
Got it. ... >> Also I say that Mr Schulze should discard all tests and method >> checking ideals/rules that are not multiwinner. > >Why? Different methods can be used for different purposes -- does one >seek a consensus opinion (voting on a proposal), does one wish to represent >a wide spectrum of views As far as I can tell there are only 2 theories but one that is acceptable to politicians. However they may be a bigger selection of approximate (partly unfair) algorithms. ... >> >> a0 * (A) + >> >> ab * (AB) + >> >> ac * (AC) + >> >> and other papers. >> >> >> >> Then increasing the "ab" Real number will tend to cause B to lose >> >> since appearing with a positive weight in the Heitzig-ian "A over B" >> >> total. >> > >> >And as far as I can see it's total rubbish, because increasing *any* >> >of a0, ab, ac etc. is going to cause an increase in the "A over B" total. >> > >> Which will tend to harm candidate B and hence the entire method could be wrong. ... >Why is this unfair? Those who vote solely for A prefer A to B. Those who >vote for A and B only (in that order) prefer A to B. Those who vote for >A and C only prefer both of them to B. This is, one assumes, the voters' >prerogative -- that they might be able to express their own preferences as >they wish! While Truncation Resistance is an axiom, all the 'a*' terms are coalesced into a single a * (A) term. Thus I ignored what happened to A. In face I wrote on candidate 'B'. It is wrong in general, to let 'B' can have a better chance of losing when (AB) papers are added. I just wrote on this topic when saying that the students of the Condorcet variant idea, have to get the faces to be deleted by the polytope expression simplification software. > >You may have a point -- but if you do, I cannot discern it. Perhaps you would >like to elucidate?. Today I wrote on this new idea of getting Mr G-A to rapidly fail 99 worthless random garbage methods, just before he had to use the exact same tests to reject his own method. He has a polytope with wrong faces instead of a need to consider an N**2 matrix and then fail in the attempt. All methods are built of polytopes and Condorcet variants are too, T get a single face wrong opens it to a review by a numerical optimizer. .... >be worth taking on board; unfortunately you totally fail to present it >in a fashion that is understandable by others. Your e-mail address is not subscribed to Politicians-And-Polytopes, and also not subscribed to the Single-Transferable-Vote mailing list. ... >(whereas you presumably do?); unfortunately one of the realities in >getting funding to do research (at least, here in the UK) is that one >be able to present one's results in a form that is easily comprehensible >by others and thus will contribute to the general public understanding. >You would fail this hurdle; and I find that a shame. That comment on credibility seems to be a bad guess. It might be helpful here for you to provide all of your axioms; and show that all are tested enough. .... >indeed the other questions around the issue). I'm starting to wonder >what definition of monotonicity you might be using. > If candidate A moves towards the 1st or jumps onto the end, and if the weight of the paper is positive, then candidate A never changes from a winner into a loser. Also the changes can be across more than 1 paper, and also the ()->(A) change is allowed. Scrambling subsequent preferences is not. So it is just the plain old monotonicity receiving STV style ballot papers. ... >> I don't know where participation is defined. But the best plan is to >> fully ignore the idea. > >Which idea? Participation criterion? Condorcet methods? Giving the >voters any form of assurance? ... I am not going to start writing on an unneeded "participation [whatever]", --- Craig Carey ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
