Hello, I've been looking into properties of election methods when there are only three candidates. I'm stumped by a few things, and I wonder if there are any comments on these three, especially the first one:
1. Does three-candidate MinMax(WV) (or alternatively Tideman, Schulze, or Heitzig) fail Participation? Moulin's incompatibility proof uses four candidates. Woodall claims MinMax(Margins) meets Participation with three candidates, and it seems implied that a three-candidate method meeting Plurality (as WV would), Condorcet, and Participation is impossible. However, I haven't been able to find any WV Participation failures with three candidates. 2. With three candidates and complete strict rankings, is Baldwin (i.e. successively eliminate the candidate with the lowest Borda score) monotonic? I know in general Baldwin isn't. The two methods I have which are not monotonic with three candidates (IRV and Raynaud) fail it very obviously, on ballot types AB BC and CA. But I haven't found any problems with Baldwin. (Interesting side note: With ballot types AB BC and CA, Baldwin gives the same results as Craig Carey's IFPP.) 3. With three candidates and complete strict rankings, is this method monotonic?: "Elect the winner of the pairwise comparison between the candidate with the fewest last-preferences, and the winner of the pairwise comparison between the other two candidates." This is Chris Benham's SCRIRVE method. It doesn't seem like this would be monotonic, but as above, I haven't found any problems with it. Any thoughts on this? I know these questions are too obscure for me to expect any answers, but thanks in advance anyway to anyone who would consider these. Kevin Venzke Découvrez le nouveau Yahoo! Mail : 250 Mo d'espace de stockage pour vos mails ! Créez votre Yahoo! Mail sur http://fr.mail.yahoo.com/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info