Range voting is neither a majority rule method, a supermajority rule method, nor a proportional representation method. Therefore, its applications are very limited.
Let's say that our voting scenario is a large group of people choosing an executive (e.g. a mayor or president), and there is enough at stake that people cannot be relied upon to vote sincerely. I don't think that range voting should be used for this scenario. Why not? Because it is not a majority rule system. It is possible for a candidate to win in range voting even if they are the last choice of 99% of the voters. Unlikely, but mathematically true. In contentious executive elections, I think that we should stick to majority rule methods. What is my operational definition of majority rule? The winner should be a member of the minimal dominant set (aka GeTChA or Smith). A weaker definition would be the mutual majority criterion. Range voting passes neither of these criteria, and so I say it has no claim on being a majority rule method. Is it somehow better than majority rule? In some non-contentious election scenarios, perhaps it can be. But in a contentious election, it is not. If a Condorcet winner is not elected, it does not necessarily mean that another candidate had a higher utility. More likely, it means that supporters of the other candidate pulled off a successful strategy. The interpersonal utility comparison aspect of range voting is just too easy to hijack for strategic purposes, so that it essentially becomes meaningless in a contentious election. If one is concerned about the tyranny of the majority, range voting is not the answer, because a well-coordinated majority can still guarantee victory for their candidate of choice. If one is concerned about the tyranny of the majority, one should look at supermajority methods and proportional representation methods, rather than at pseudomajority methods like range voting, approval voting, and Borda. Sincerely, James Green-Armytage http://fc.antioch.edu/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/voting.htm http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/voting.htm ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info