Mike,
--- Mike <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I might as well ask another question, since this one went so well: Has
> anyone tried replacing Borda with Range voting in methods like Borda
> elimination or Nanson to see what the properties and paradoxes were?
In what I call Approval-Elimination Runoff, the least-approved candidate
is eliminated until some candidate has a majority of first-preferences.
Assuming approval is not recalculated somehow after every elimination, and
assuming it's legal to approve or disapprove all the candidates, then
the method is monotonic but fails Condorcet (in contrast to Borda-Elim).
I think it's a decent method.
Kevin Venzke
Découvrez le nouveau Yahoo! Mail : 250 Mo d'espace de stockage pour vos mails !
Créez votre Yahoo! Mail sur http://fr.mail.yahoo.com/
----
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
