You said that Approval and CR were "pseudo-majority methods", because the information needed for their strategy is only available from outside the voting system.
Wrong. Each Approval election, by its reported vote totals, gives information for subsequent Approval strategy.
If Nader outpolls the Republican, then Nader-preferrers will know that they needn't vote for the Democrat in subsequent elections.
Approval quickly homes in on the voter median, and then stays there.
Condorcet goes directly to the voter median in its 1st election. Approval & CR do so in thei r 2nd election. That's the price of simplicity and easy proposability.
Myerson & Weber point out that Approval (and CR) guarantee that if there's a candidate at the voter median position, s/he will be the only candidate who can win at Myerson-Weber equilibrium.
Because critreria and standards are individual, subjective, and relativist, your criteria and standards, and your preference among methods aren't wrong. But your statement about where Approval's strategy information must come from is incorrect. And your proposed classification name foir Approval and CR is silly.
Mike Ossipoff
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