From: "James Green-Armytage" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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because of unfamiliarity (and a sense that C's party is less well-equipped to govern than the major parties), but most people prefer C to their least favorite major party candidate, and C also develops a substantial core following of his own. Below are the preference relationships for different percentages of the electorate. For the sake of simplicity, let's assume that utility gaps are evenly spaced.
28: L>C>R 5: L>R>C 16: C>L>R 10: C>R>L 10: R>L>C 31: R>C>L
C is a Condorcet winner, winning pairwise comparisons by 57-43 and 54-46 (substantial margins, if not landslide margins). Therefore, I assume that you will agree that C occupies the voter median. Mike, my question to you is this: How do you think this approval voting scenario will play out? What strategies will the voters use? Will C win in the first election? The second election, given similar candidates and voters? If so, how and why? Of course, one cannot authoritatively say who would win, since it's only a fantasyland scenario, but what I'm interested in is your understanding of the way in which approval tends toward the voter median, as expressed through analysis of a particular example. Of course, anyone else is very much welcome to answer this question according to their own opinion. I'm asking Mike in particular because it was his assertion that got me thinking in this particular direction. But I think differing viewpoints might be quite helpful.
If first preference polls were accurate, R would be billed as most likely to win, and L as second most likely. On the basis of this information rational strategy voters would place their approval cutoffs next to R on the side of L:
28 LC|R 5 L|RC 16 CL|R 10 CR|L 10 R|LC 31 R|CL
The respective approval totals for L, C, and R would be 49, 54, and 51, which means that C would likely win the first time around.
If preferences remain the same, then the second time around C would be most likely to win, with R second most likely, so the cutoffs would be next to C on the side of R:
28 LC|R 5 LR|C 16 C|LR 10 C|RL 10 RL|C 31 R|CL
The respective approval totals for L, C, and R would be 43, 54, and 46, which means that C's place as approval winner is stable, until the voter preferences change.
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