I'd said:
The party that is always CW or at the voter-median would keep winning at MW equilibrium. Just that one party.
But it's true that Approval would fairly deal with any number of parties. But it wouldn't include them all in a winning equilibrium, nor should it.
Russ replied:
If only one party is popular, then obviously that party will dominate. That is true for practically *any* democratic system.
I reply:
No, you don't undestand at all. I'll patiently repeat what I said: With Plurality, nearly any 2 parties can keep on being the top votegetters at MW equilibrium. With Approval, if one party is consistently the CW, no other party can win at MW equilibrium. That CW party will soon win, and will keep winning. And no, that is not true of all methods.
I'd said:
"Except that now it's much more complicated": Much more complicated than what? Than Plurality? It isn't much more complicated, and in fact it isn't more complicated at all, to vote for the candidate that you'd vote for in Plurality and also for those whom you like better, as opposed to just voting in a Plurality election.
That strategy may be useful only for the first election in which Approval Voting is used. After that, it may no longer be useful, depending on the results of that first Approval election. We've already concluded that Approval can support more than two viable parties, but the strategy you stated assumes that two parties are still dominant, as under plurality. If that assumption is true, then Approval hasn't made much of a difference.
I reply:
Russ, you're all confused about this. You need to read about the Approval strategies before expounding about them.
The Approval strategies that we've been discussing, including the ones that used to be at your website, are intended to deal with uncertainty.
Your astounding confusion is revealed when you say that the Best Frontrunner strategy assumes that 2 parties will be "dominant", and that therefore Approval has failed.
The BF strategy assumes that the voter has an impression about which 2 candidates will be the frontrunners. That doesn't mean that there's a 2-party system, only that there are 2 especially popular candidates, at least in that voter's perception. In any political system, with or without a 2-party system, there will often be reason to expect that a certain candidate will be the biggest votegetter, and that a certain 2 cancidates will be the 2 biggest votegetters.
And of course BF is only one of a number of Approval strategies. Sometimes the voter doesn't have an impression about 2 parties being the likely frontrunners. Then there are a variety of other strategies that s/he can use in Approval.
Russ continued:
It is possible, of course, that the "Republicrats" will still be dominant for a while -- perhaps a long while -- after Approval is instituted.
I reply:
Only if they occupy the voter median or CW position. Otherwise, if someone else is at the voter median position, the Republocrats can't win at MW equilibrium in Approval.
Russ continued:
In that case, then the strategy of "voting for the candidate that you'd vote for in Plurality and also for those whom you like better" will still work -- but only because Approval hasn't worked as well as hoped by some.
I reply:
Wrong. That strategy will "work" for the voter because it will maximize his expectation. It will also work in the sense of quickly homing in on the CW.
I'd said:
Actually, a genuine libertarian isn't worse than a Republican. A genuine libertarian is the opposite of a Republican on authoritarian issues. But that's a genuine libertarian, as opposed to an authoritarian.
A "genuine" libertarian would immediately stop all welfare payments, aggressively phase out Social Security and Medicare, and end "progressive" taxation to make the poor pay their "fair share" of taxes (under Bush II, the percentage of the "poor" who pay no federal income taxes at all is approaching 40% if I recall correctly).
Is that "better than a Republican," Mike?
I reply:
A genuine libertarian may honestly believe in those policies. If they don't work or aren't publicly accepted, an honest libertarian officeholder will still be more honest than a Republican. So far as I'm aware, the Lilbertarian party isn't bought. Of course the libertarians and Libertarians have policy proposals that I and most others consider a bad idea. But what makes genuine libertarians better than Republicans is their honesty. Also, there are many authoritarian issues on which I agree with the libertarians and Libertarians. I'm referring to libertarians, not you.
In our poll, I ranked the Libertarian candidates below the Republicans, at the bottom, because I felt that it was necessary to assume that you were representative of libertarians. Now I doubt that that is so, especially if Libertarians are libertarian in any meaningful sense of the word.
Russ continued:
And while we're at it, would you consider approving the Republican to prevent that libertarian philosophy from being enacted? Just wondering.
I reply:
If Lilbertarians are actually libertarian, I'd probably rank them over the Republicans, because, as I said, libertarians are honest and not bought. In Approval, if the Libertarians are genuinely libertarian and as honest as they now seem, and if they had a chance of winning, and no progressive had a good chance of winning, I'd probably vote, in Approval, for the Libertarians in addition to the progressives.
But that's an unrealistic scenario: Nader is many times more popular than the Libertarians, and so there wouldn't be a need to do that. Though I'd rank genuine libertarians over the Republicans in Condorcet, in Approval there'd be no need for progressives to vote Libertarian, since Nader & Camejo are so much more popular than the Libertarians.
I don't mean for any of this to offend genuine libertarians, whose candidates I respect for their honesty, and whom I'd rank over the Republicans and Democrats.
But if a Libertarian advocated the things that you advocate, that person should be ranked below the Republicans, at the bottom of one's ranking. As I said, that wouldn't be a libertarian in any meaningful sense of the word.
I'd said:
Hardly. The fact that some Approval strategies are based on estimates of who will likely be the top-2 votegetters, or on other probabilities (as opposed to certainties) doesn't lessen its usefulness as a practical guide for voters. Some Approval strategies require more to be estimated than others do. Some require different things to be estimated. Check the recent postings about Approval strategy.
You didn't get my point. My point was that many or most of the strategies might not useful when, for example, several parties have rough parity, and who is really ahead of whom is unclear.
I reply:
Wrong. That was your confused "point" that I was replying to. As I said in the very paragraph that you were replying to there, a number of Approval strategies are intended for dealing with uncertainty. Your "point" is that Approval strategies aren't useful when it's uncertain who is ahead. Your point is all confused, because, as I said in the paragraph that was right in front of your face, a number of Approval strategies are intended for situations of uncertainty.
You're expouning on something about which you haven't a clue. You need to inform yourself at least a little before posting.
Mike Ossipoff
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