Mike mentioned Nash equilibrium to me a year or two ago. I thought it was interesting, and we agreed to put some material about it on the website. For whatever reason, the material never came.

Let me also mention that I had suggested to Mike way back that we provide proofs for his criteria such as SFC, GSFC, and others. Several readers had requested them. He never sent me any proofs or explanations.

That leads me to wonder if Mike can really prove any or all of his criteria. He may have posted proofs here on EM, but if he did I don't understand why he didn't send them to me for the website.

In any case, I must admit that I was naive when I started the website with Mike. I had assumed that his criteria were more or less widely accepted by the EM community, but only later did I realize that they may be a "Mike-only" sort of deal. Perhaps someone here can help me understand the situation. Are Mike's criteria such as SFC, GSFC, SDSC, WDSC, and FBC "widely" recognized, or do they live only in Mike's mind?

Finally, a little "friendly" advice to Mike. He probably won't take it, but the loss will only be his. I suggest that he formally document his criteria in one or more technical papers and submit them to peer-reviewed journals or conferences. I don't even know which journals or conferences would be appropriate, but there must be some. Perhaps someone can suggest some.

By the way, conference papers are easier to get accepted than journal papers, but they require travel. Then again, if Mike is really serious (and he certainly seems to think he is), he should eventually meet some of his colleagues in person. You can't build a "career" on an email list.

--Russ

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:



I forgot to include all the wording that I intended for the equilibrium criteria:


And a different naming might be good too.

Falsifyingness:

A method is falsifying if, with that method, there are situations (configurations of candidates and voter preferences) in which there is a CW, and there are no Nash equilibria in which the CW wins and no one reverses a preference.

[end of falsifyingness definition]

Expressiveness:

A method is expressive if, with that method, every situation with a CW has at least one Nash equilibrium in which the CW wins and no one votes a less-liked candidate equal to or over a more-liked candidate (as I define that).

[end of expressiveness definition]

Also, instead of the name that I suggested for the criterion relating to James´ co-operation/defection dilemma, let me instead just say that methods that have that dilemma are "defection-vulnerable" or "defection-prone".

So I´ve defined falsifyingness, expressiveness, and defection-proneness.

Of course any method that is expressive is nonfalsifying.

When a method is said to be falsifying, non-falsifying, expressive, or non-expressive, that term should be followed by "a", "s1", or "s2", depending on which voting extension of Nash equilibrium is being referred to. If those terms are used without that designation, then "a" is the default assumption. The "a" versions of nonfalsifyingness or expressiveness are the most demanding versions.

I defined "a", "s1", & "s2" in a posting yesterday.

But I´d like to replace "a" with "ac", so that it won´t need the quotation marks to disinguish it from the word "a".

I haven´t examined many methods for these properties, but Approval is nonfalsifying, so are the wv Condorcet versions. And BeatpathWinner/CSSD and RP are probably expressive. Maybe also Bucklin, and ERIRV and Kevin´s Approval elimination when they have AERLO.

Pluralitly, IRV, and Condorcet(margins) are falsifying, in all of that term´s versions ("a", "s1", & "s2").

I expect that methods that meet WDSC are nonfalsifying, and that methods that meet SDSC are expressive, but I´m not sure whether those properties always coincide.

Mike Ossipoff

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