Dear Russ,
I wrote (27 Feb 2005):
I interpret Mike Ossipoff's "Strategy-Free Criterion" (SFC) and "Generalized Strategy-Free Criterion" (GSFC) as follows:
"X >> Y" means that a majority of the voters strictly prefers candidate X to candidate Y.
SFC: Suppose (1) A >> B and (2) the partial individual rankings can be completed in such a manner that candidate A is a Condorcet candidate. Then candidate B must be elected with zero probability.
You wrote (27 Feb 2005):
In your interpretation of SFC above, I think your supposition 2 should actually be part of the result. Here is my attempt at it:
SFC: Suppose A >> B. Then partial individual rankings can be completed in such a manner that no preferences are reversed and candidate B must be elected with zero probability.
Well, it seems to me that your interpretation does't work when there is a circular tie with A >> B, B >> C, and C >> A.
Example:
40 BCA 35 CAB 25 ABC
Markus Schulze
Before Mike has a conniption, I should probably say that I misstated his SFC criterion. SFC stipulates that A is the "sincere" Condorcet winner. The exact definition or correctness of SFC was not my point, however.
--Russ
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