Russ said:
Some of those criteria were Mike-style criteria and some were normal criteria. However, looking back at it, I see that we had the Condorcet criteria defined in terms of true preferences, with the stipulation that the voters voted "sincerely." Stipulating that the voters vote sincerely simply eliminates the voting strategy and essentially converts a Mike-style criterion to a normal criterion.
I reply:
No, the Condorcet's Criterion that was at the website at the technical evaluation page was a Mike style criterioni entirely. It referred to the CW (which you called the IDW, defined as I define the CW), and it stipulated sincere voting. Both the CW and sincere voting are defined by me in terms of preference, and were defined at your website in terms of preference.
If you stipulate "sincere" voting, then you are eliminating the voting strategy and stipulating that the actual votes cast are identical to the "sincere" or true preferences. In that case, a Mike-style criterion is equivalent to a standard tally-rules-based criterion.
You can take any standard criterion, play this trick, and call it a Mike-style criterion. You will only be obfuscating the issue and adding nothing of any value, however. That's exactly what we did with the old Condorcet criterion on our former website, and looking back at it, I realize it was an embarrassment. The Condorcet criterion can and should be defined in terms of actual votes only.
Russ continues:
But it involves an unnecessary step that only confuses the matter. In other words, we had a normal criterion bollocksed up to make it look superficially like a Mike-style criterion.
I reply:
No, that Condoret's Criterion was thoroughly a Mike style criterion, for the reasons stated above.
Then "that" Condoret's Criterion wasn't the standard Condorcet criterion. I could just as well define my own version of monotonicity too, but what would it accomplish other than making me look like a fool?
<cut>
Russ continues:
Take SFC, the "Strategy-Free Criterion":
"If an Ideal Democratic Winner (IDW) exists, and if a majority prefers the IDW to another candidate, then the other candidate should not win if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies any preferences."
I reply:
That's your wording, corrected by me so that it retains the meaning that I intended. But let me state it my way:
If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win.
Actually, I think Approval passes this criterion. If that majority draw their cutoff between X and Y, then Y can't win.
I realize that some criteria are defined for ranking methods only, but I clearly recall that Mike intended for his criteria to apply to all methods (as implied by the compliance table at the top of the old "Technical Evaluation" page).
The question is then whether rating candidates equally in Approval constitutes a "sincere" vote when the voter doesn't really consider them equal. If not, that needs to explicitly specified as part of the criterion definition, because it is certainly *not* obvious. Since that was not explicitly stated, I say Approval passes SFC as stated above.
<cut>
Russ continues:
Now, what does this Mike-style criterion tell us? It tells us that a majority can use a strategy to thwart a minority.
I reply:
We're finding out that Russ hadn't a clue about the meaning of the criteria that were at his website.
Provided that no one falsifies a preference,
B loses without the CW>B voters doing other than voting sincerely. I don't call that a use of strategy by the CW>B voters. The point of the criterion is that, with complying methods, under the criterion's premise conditions, that majority needn't do other than vote sincerely, to make Y lose.
Russ continues:
So why, then, is it called the "Strategy-Free" criterion? It is called that because the strategy doesn't require any reversal of true preferences. But it *does* involve insincere truncation strategy
I reply:
Not at all. Russ just stated the criterion, and it didn't say that the members of that majority could keep Y from winning if that majority truncated. It said that if no one falsifies a preference, and if the majority who prefer the CW to Y vote sincerely, then Y won't win, with a complying method. The CW>Y voters needn't do other than rank sincerely. That's why it's called the Strategy-Free criterion.
Actually, Mike is right about that. I just re-read the criterion, and it doesn't involve truncation by the majority. I guess that justifies the insults, eh?
Maybe Mike will wake up some day and realize that he started the insults, and he perpetuates them. I will be happy to stop insulting Mike as soon as he stops insulting me and learns how to disagree respectfully. Until that time (or until I get off this email list), I will continue to expose him as the pedantic amateur he is. He badly needs to learn a lesson about professionalism even if he is an amateur.
Russ continues:
, which the criterion itself does not state. So the criterion name itself is misleading.
I replyi:
Russ has mislead himself by being unable to read what he's just copied.
Another insult. ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
