Russ Paielli said:
>Unless there's more to it than you said, I don't see how that even qualifies as a ranked
>method. It seems like Approval with the restriction that only two candidates can be >approved. Am I missing something?
Well, it's a ranked method in the sense that it takes ranked ballots as inputs. But you're right, it doesn't really do what a person would normally expect from a ranked method. Which is sort of the point: If you try to satisfy strong FBC you are forced to a method that functions more like Approval, and the only time when the method distinguishes between your top 2 choices is if they're tied for total points.
Well, it's a ranked method in the sense that it takes ranked ballots as inputs. But you're right, it doesn't really do what a person would normally expect from a ranked method. Which is sort of the point: If you try to satisfy strong FBC you are forced to a method that functions more like Approval, and the only time when the method distinguishes between your top 2 choices is if they're tied for total points.
In other words, you can only "satisfy" strong FBC in rare cases.
Which isn't terribly interesting in and of itself. Where it gets more interesting is that, if I can complete my proof on strong FBC, it will be easy to extend the results to other types of strategic manipulations, and show that (in a sense which I will carefully define if I ever get it to a pubishable stage) trying to minimize strategic incentives leads inevitably to methods that look more like Approval Voting.
Alex
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