Dear Mike! you wrote: > Hereīs the actual definition of SFC: > > SFC: > > If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to > candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldnīt win. > > [end of SFC definition] > > Which part of that donīt you undestand?
Well, I at least think I understand it, assuming you speak of the *sincere* CW (otherwise, that is, if you meant CW according to the cast prefernces, then each Condorcet method would fulfil SFC trivially by definition, and that cannot be what you meant). But: Can you tell me just one method which passes that criterion? Approval certainly doesn't: If the sincere preferences are 2 X>Y, both approved 1 Y>X, only Y approved and all three vote sincerely, then (a) no one falsifies a preference, (b) a majority prefers the CW (X) to Y, (c) that majority votes sincerely, but of course Y still wins. So, although I find anti-strategy criteria most important and are completely d'accord with you that their formulation will of course contain references to the sincere preferences of the voters, I still don't think that this particular criterion, at least not in the above version, is particularly useful... Yours, Jobst ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
