Mike, --- MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Kevin continued: > > So, a method would satisfy WDSC if the C>A>D>E>B>F>G voters, comprising a > majority, could deny B the win by voting C=A>D=E>B=F>G. It isn't necessary > that there be any other way for them to deny B the win. > > I reply; > > You got it. One is all it takes.
> Kevin continued: > > I think that's kind > of a silly way to satisfy WDSC > > I reply: > > It was you who talked about a method in which it had to be done in that > particular way. You must distinguish between silliness of WDSC and silliness > of your hypothetical methods. A good way to make that distinction would be > to find a silly way that needs to be voted in order to make an actual > proposed method meet WDSC. Can you do that? That would be missing the point. If WDSC makes a meaningful guarantee, there shouldn't be a silly, meaningless way of satisfying it. > Kevin continues: > > FBC: > >By voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite, a voter should > >never gain an outcome that he/she likes better than every outcome that > >he/she could get without voting a less-liked candidate over his/her > >favorite. > > I think this is clear, but hard to use. Suppose if I vote B>A>C>D>E, when A > is my > sincere favorite (that is, I like candidates who come earlier > alphabetically), then > B is elected. Suppose we try 20 other ways of voting, all with A at the top > or > equal top, and these all elect E. I want to conclude that this is an FBC > failure. > I can't, though, because it might be the case that e.g. A=E>B=D>C will elect > A. > > I reply: > > The way to demonstrate that a method fails a criterion is to find a > situation in which, with that method, the criterion´s premise conditions are > met, and the criterion´s requirement is not met. > Also, in general I have to check what results one could get from B>C>D>E>A, > D>C>E>B>A, > C>B>E>D>A, etc., no matter how unlikely it is to occur to someone to vote in > such > insincere ways. > > You do that. But first find out what the method is, and the situation. > Kevin continued: > > So I think a criterion like WDSC could afford to be more precise. > > I reply: > > But you forgot to say in what way WDSC, or a criterion like it, is > imprecise. A criterion is imprecise if you can show that its wording could > mean more than one thing, or that it isn´t possible to say what its wording > means. I meant that a criterion like WDSC should guarantee more. As it is, not only is it abnormally difficult to verify compliance, but there are silly ways of satisfying it. Compare my rendition: > Kevin continued: > > As a first > guess, I suggest: "If a majority of all the voters vote A in first or equal > first, and B in last or equal last, then B mustn't win." If that doesn't > resemble Mike's intention > > I reply: > > ...and it doesn´t resemble WDSC. But it implies WDSC, is easier to check, and doesn't allow silly methods of compliance. Kevin Venzke Découvrez le nouveau Yahoo! Mail : 250 Mo d'espace de stockage pour vos mails ! Créez votre Yahoo! Mail sur http://fr.mail.yahoo.com/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info