It would be interesting to compare that method with what I call TACF, Total Approval Chain Filling:
Proceeding from the highest approval candidate to the lowest approval candidate, fit as many as possible into a chain totally ordered by pairwise defeat. The candidate that beats all of the others in this chain wins the election.
The two methods always agree when there are only three candidates, since they both pick the CW when there is one, and both eliminate the lowest approval candidate when there is no CW.
TACF always picks a member of the Banks set. It seems improbable that Kevin's version of Approval Runoff always picks from Banks.
Both methods are monotone and clone proof.
I think they both satisfy Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives, at least when approval ties are broken appropriately.
Bye For Now,
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