Russ says:
IIRC, I said SFC could be well-defined if it were based on a clearly specified model of "true" voter preferences. But then it is only as good as that model.
I comment:
I posted an explanation of why, for my criteria to be well-defined, it doesn't matter if preference is well-defined, or if it's meaning is unknown, or if it even has a meaning.
And I asked you if there's some particular sentence in that explanation that you take exception to. But instead of saying why you disagree with that explanation, you merely keep repeating your claim that my criteria that mention "prefer" are only as good as a clearly-specified model of preference that they're based on.
Perhaps you, Russ, haven't read the conduct guidelines for EM. You're asked to not keep repeating a claim without responding to the answers that have been posted to that claim.
But, since you seem to have missed it the first time, I'll repeat something that I said before. Maybe an example will help.
WDSC says (with a little wording-neating) "If a majority of the voters prefer X to Y, then they should have a way of voting that will ensure that Y won't win, without reversing a preference."
I've defined reversing a preference as voting some X over some Y, and preferring Y to X.
I posted an example in which a majority are said to prefer B to A. For brevity I'll refer to them as "that majority". The example said the preferences of the voters. In that example I specified the ballots of the voters not in that majorilty. Why not? For the method to comply with the criterion, it mustn't be possible to write any example in which the criterion's premise is met and its requirement isn't met. The example-writer can say anything that isn't inconsistent with the criterion's premise conditions.
And, from what is said in that example, the only way the members of that majority could keep A from winning was for some of them to reverse a preference, by some voting B over C, though they prefer C to B. Or for some voting C over A, though they prefer A to C.
Now, do you think that it matters what "prefer" means, or that a "model" of preference is needed?
WDSC's premise stipulates that a majority prefer some X to some Y. The example says that 199 of the 349 voters prefer B to A. No matter what, if anything, preference means, the example complies with WDSC's premise, with respect to that majority.
If what is written in the example, whatever, if anything, it means, were true, then, for that majority to keep A from winning, some of them would have to vote in a way that I've defined as "reversing a preference", given what the example says about whom they prefer to whom.
Likewise, the definition of reversing a preference is unaffected by what preference means. If people said in the example to prefer C to B vote B over C, then, by the definition of reversing a preference, they're reversing a preference. And that's true whatever "prefer" means.
I made a stronger claim when I said that it doesn't even matter if "prefer" means anything.
How could that be so?:
The question that has to be asked, when considering a criterion failure example is: If what is written in the example were true, would the criterion's requirement be met, when the tested method is used?
I said _if_. That's important. If "prefer" doesn't mean anything, then no sentence that has "prefer" as its verb can even be a statement, much less a true one. But that's irrrelevant, because I said "_If_ what is written in the example were true...".
Russ continues:
Mike doesn't see a need for such a model because he doesn't understand the underlying problem of basing his criteria on "true" voter preferences.
I comment:
You haven't shown an underlying problem. Nor have you named a particular sentence that you don't agree with in my explanation for why a definition or model of preference isn't needed.
I'd said:
Is that criterion of yours supposed to be in some way a counterpart of SFC? Your criterion is a method-dedicated criterion, of course, mentioning margins. SFC doesnīt mention winning-votes.
Russ says:
No, SFC doesn't explicitly mention winning votes, but it implies it. That was my main point.
I comment:
Then you didn't support your main point. Anyway, for any criterion, meeting that criterion "im;lies" some method or type of method. If a method is "implied" by a criterion, then we say that that method passes the criterion. Insofar as the criterion sounds important to you, then the method is a good one.
The only time there's something to criticize there is if the criterion is nothing but a restatement of the method. But even that has nothing wrong with it unless the criterion can't be justified in some other way.
So, even if the majority defensive strategy criteria were just restatements of wv (but they aren't), there's be nothing wrong with that unless you can show that they can't be justified on their own merits, and that therefore they seem to have been contrived jut to make wv look good.
But I've told why I wrote the defensive strategy criteria. I arrived at wv by seeking a kind of method that would do well at avoiding drastsic defensive strategy need. The strategy goals led to the method. As I said, very soon after proposing wv, I was posting to EM criteria that were early versions of SFC, WDSC, and SDSC, as measures for my goal of minimizing defensive strategy need.
SFC stands for Strategy-Free Criterion, because, with complying
methods, the majority described in SFCīs premise doesnīt need any strategy in the plausible situation of that premise.
Russ continues:
What is it about a majority of voters that is so special?
I reply:
As I've frequently said, a majority of the voters is a group that's big enough that it's possible to make certain guarantees about its need for strategy. That's it. That's why I speak of a majority of the voters. Don't look for other reasons.
Russ continues:
Suppose we have a proposition on the ballot, and the result is 47% to 44%?
I comment:
Then we can say that "Yes" pairbeats "No", and would win in any Condorcet version, without being a majority defeat.
I assume those are percentages of those who turned in valid ballots that voted on other contests.
Russ continues:
Do we say it didn't pass because a majority of the voters did not approve it? Of course not. It passes. Why? Because a majority of the voters WHO VOTED ON IT approved it -- and that's all that matters.
I reply:
Fine. Likewise, as I said, Condorcet would elect Yes in that 2-alternative election, because Yes pairbeats its only opponent, and is therefore CW.
Russ continues:
But Mike thinks that if voters abstain from voting on a particular Condorcet pairwise race, then their opinion should still matter in terms of setting some significant threshold.
I reply:
That's news to me. I haven't spoken of the opinion of people who didn't vote on a pair.
But I've said that a majority of the voters is a group large enough that we can make certain guarantees about its strategy need.
Russ continues:
If that's true, then why not count the registered voters who didn't bother to vote at all (either for that particular office or for the entire election)?
I comment:
Because it isn't necessary. Because a majority of the voters is enough to ensure certain basic but important guarantees.
But I encourage you to advocate versions of my criteria that instead use those other majorities. When you do, you'll find that your change in the kind of majority that you refer to doesn't change the fact that wv meets the majority defensive strategy criteria, and margins fails them.
Russ continues:
If only half of the registered voters even bother to show up, why isn't the "majority" threshold for your SFC the majority of all the registered voters? Or all the eligible voters even if they aren't registered?
I comment:
You've asked that question twice. Refer to my answer to your first asking of the question, directly above your second asking of it.
Russ continues:
I think your criterion is inconsistent. It defines a majority in terms that include voters who didn't see fit to vote on a particular pairwise race, but it doesn't account for voters who didn't vote at all for that office or for the entire election.
I comment:
But you forgot to tell us in what way you think that it's inconsistent to speak of a majority of the voters.
I'd said:
Anyone can write a criterion such as the IRV criterion that says that a method passes the IRV criterion if it chooses IRVīs winner.Thatīs essentionally what your "Margins SFC" is.
Russ says:
And that is essentially what your SFC criterion is too, except that it is written for wv Condorcet.
I reply:
Which part of SFC restates the rules of wv Condorcet?
Ruiss, you're sloppy, as I've already told you.
But even the IRV criterion would be worthwhile if it could be justified in some way on its own merits.
And even if SFC were a restatement of wv (but it isn't), I justify SFC on its own merits. I tell why it's desirable that a method meet SFC. SFC was'nt written to make wv look good after wv had been chosen for some reason other than its strategic properties. The strategic goals led to wv, and to the criteria which were written as measures of success with that goal.
I'd said:
Thatīs been answered many times. Youīve shown that a pairwise defeat
that is better by winning-votes can look not as good by margins. Amazing. Itīs because wv and margins are different.
Russ says:
Yes, I'm sure it's been "answered" many times. What does that prove, Mike? Does the truth of a proposition depend on how many times it's been asserted? Apparently you think so.
I comment:
It's a waste of time to have to repeat everything for you.
I'd said:
Russ wants us to count those 49 voters who voted against the 51-49
defeat. Some like to do that, saying that itīs more "symmetrical" if we count them as we count the winning-votes.
symmetrically related. Why?
But, if X pairwise-beats Y, the X>Y voters and the Y>X voters arenīt
The Y voters lost.
Russ says:
But we're trying to resolve an ambiguity here, Mike. We *must* ultimately choose a winner who "lost" to another candidate.
I comment:
That's what I'd said in the message that you're replying to :-) You're parroting.
Russ continues:
The question is not *whether* something needs to give but rather *what* needs to give. According to your impeccable "logic", nobody should win.
I reply:
Russ, check oiut what you've quoted me saying, directly below:
If every candidate has a pairwise defeat, then, to elect someone, we
have to disregard their pairwise defeat, we have to overrule the publicīs statement that someone else would be better, if weīre to appoint that person the winner.
When we do that, weīre overruling the people who voted for the X>Y
defeat. As I said, we shouldnīt do that lightly. So donīt avoidably overrule more voters than necessary, by using a count rule that doesnīt distinguish the voters who won from the voters who lost.
You see, Russ, if we keep the X>Y defeat, we arenīt overruleing the
Y>X voters. The Y>X voters were overruled when they were defeated in the public vote between X and Y, when the public said that they collectively prefer X to Y.
Russ says:
I know the whole song and dance, Mike. And it's nothing more than your arbitrary "logic" about what should and shouldn't be "overruled."
I comment:
No, it's more a matter of who has already been overruled by the public's voted preferences. The Y>X voters have been so overruled.
Russ continues:
But the bottom line is that, while you are perfectly willing to overrule a 49-0 defeat , you consider a 51-49 defeat sacrosanct. That's arbitrary whether you are willing to recognize it or not.
I comment:
As I said, it's common knowledge that you can contrive a situtation where the defeat that's better by wv isn't as good by margins. So what? Choose based on which seems more important, on its own merits. I've given you some suggestions for making that choice.
Mike Ossipoff
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