Russ wrote:
One of Jim's "criteria" was "system easily explained." Surprisingly, he put "somewhat" for both IRV and Condorcet.
IRV is much easier to explain than Condorcet, and I believe that is the primary reason that it is more popular.
Jim Lindsay is probably speaking from experience when he says that IRV is only "somewhat" easy to explain. He is the secretary of Californians for Electoral Reform, and I'm sure that he's been involved in promoting IRV for a long time.
Yes, but has he ever tried to explain Schulze or Ranked Pairs to the level of detail that someone would need to know to actually implement it? I can explain IRV to that level of detail off the top of my head, but I cannot do the same for the Condorcet defeat-dropping methods.
I think that IRV is more popular than Condorcet because it is more of a known quantity. It has long been used in other countries without anything horrible happening, and it is very similar to the two round runoff, having few disadvantages, and an obvious advantage in terms of cost.
That is true, but it begs the question of *why* it has "long been used." Could it be that IRV has "long been used," in part, because it is relatively easy to explain and understand?
Condorcet, on the other hand, remains a largely theoretical entity.
People don't know exactly what the result will be from a Condorcet system,
and so many are wary of it. IRV is safe, and Condorcet is not so safe. The tradeoff, then, is between familiarity/safety, and the chance for
radical change in our political system: hopefully one which displaces the
two party duopoly that is so deeply entrenched in our political system, in
favor of a more authentic democracy (rule of the people). Thus, I suggest
that Condorcet tends to appeal more to people who are dissatisfied with
our political system on a deeper level, and who are not satisfied with
minor changes.
Oh, I think many IRV supporters are radical enough. They just mistakenly believe that IRV is the way out of the two-party system.
Also, I suppose it's possible that Condorcet suffers a bit from the lack of broad consensus as to which Condorcet completion methods should be used. More on that later.
Absolutely.
But another reason why IRV is so popular is that people are really active in working for IRV. For Condorcet to take off, there need to be more people pushing for its adoption on whatever level possible. Student
Whoa -- just a minute. Saying that IRV is popular because of its advocates is begging the question of why the advocates like it to start with. I think the underlying reason is that it is easier to understand and explain. Unlike defeat-dropping Condorcet schemes, IRV requires no sophisticated "algorithms." Counting first-choices and transferring votes is hardly a fancy algorithm.
government elections are a good place to start. Mayoral elections for
relatively small towns/cities. Church organizations, hobby groups, NGO's.
Choosing between multiple options _within_ a council or other small,
official group. Whatever! In other words, IRV is more popular because it
has been blessed with more active supporters. So let's get out there and
try to get Condorcet methods adopted, eh? Brainstorm a bit: of the myriad
organizations that use voting, which are local enough and approachable
enough for you to have a chance to convince them to use Condorcet?
(For my part, I'll try to mount Condorcet and STV campaigns in whatever
university I end up doing my graduate work.)
But you have a problem, James. Which Condorcet variation will you promote? Until Condorcet advocates come together somehow, potential users will wonder why they can't agree on the best variation.
Regards, Russ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
