I'll get to Least Additional Votes after the other issues you brought up:
You wrote:
I guess often also the wish to make election results a linear preference order is present. This happens although we (in theory) already know that group preferences can not be presented as a linear preference order (although individual preferences maybe can). For this reason I don't feel quite comfortable with Condorcet completion rules that try to re-establish this linear structure of individual preferences also in the final results (since that simply is not natural for group preferences).
I reply:
But we can't avoid the matter just by not usng Condorcet. When there's a circular tie in preferences, electing someone will necessarily mean electing someone to whom someone else is collectively preferred by the electorate. Not collecting rankings, or not counting them pairwise merely conceals or ignores those preference, but they're still there.
Since, with a circular tie, we must elect someone who has a pairwise-defeat, then why not disregard the defeat that is supported by the fewest people?
You continued:
In the election methods mailing list I have in the recent months observed lots of discussion on criteria that are related to making the voting methods as strategy free as possible. Sometimes I have even gotten the impression that when electing the winner from the candidates in the top loop (Smith set) it could be anyone in the top loop, as long as the numerous strategy criteria are fulfilled.
I reply:
Well sure it could, and that depends on what one wants from a voting system. If someone values certain criteria, then yes, the right choice from the Smith set is the candidate chosen by a method that meets criteria that one likes.
You continued:
I guess this has not really been the case
I reply:
Well, it's the case for me, as stated in the previous paragraph of this reply.
You continued:
, but my point is that one should give high priority to selecting the candidate that we think is best, and maybe a bit less priority to all the strategical considerations.
I reply:
Sure, it goes without saying that the best thing would be to choose the candidate who is best. But the problem is when the voters don't agree on who is best. I claim that we deviate farthest from the best when we falsify our preferences, when we bury our favorite and fear to express what we want. That's why the strategy criteria are important.
You continued:
This is based on the assumption that strategical voting is not that easy in real life, at least not in elections where the number of voters is large.
I reply:
It happens in every election in the U.S. People say that they're abandoning their favorite to vote strategically. Millions do so.
You continue:
Many of the strategical voting cases are problematic only in situations where the voting behaviour of the voters is known. In real life this is seldom the case.
I reply:
The fact that the voters don't have good information on which to base strategy has never stopped them from attempting to vote strategically, by using the unreliable strategic information that they've heard from their tv.
You continue:
With this I want to say that sometimes sim
plicity
and/or "real life need" based rules may be more sensible than detailed strategy based criteria.
I reply:
But the defensive strategy criteria are very much based on real life need. That need, indicated by numerous conversaions with demoralized voters, led me to propose the criteria.
Must quit now. Will ask about Least Additional votes later. But it sounds like Dodgson, which doesn't do well by criteria, including, but not limited to, the defensive strategy criteria.
Mike Ossipoff
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