Hi Chris,
Good to hear from you! Some replies follow...
>I agree with your positive remarks about Raynaud here. I regard
>Raynaud(Gross Loser) as one of the easy-to-explain contenders.
I agree that Raynaud is easy to explain. I don't know about Gross Loser,
though... Winning votes is most intuitive to me. "This candidate was
opposed by 60% of voters in a pairwise contest! Eliminate him! Bam!"
I guess the GL equivalent would be "This candidate only got 30% of the
vote in a pairwise contest! Eliminate him! Bam!" I dunno... maybe.
>
>"Raynaud (GL): Until one candidate remains, repeatedly eliminate the
>candidate with the fewest votes in any of the pairwise comparisons among
>the remaining candidates."
>
>Brief and succinct enough? In a previous post I identified two other
>possible versions of Raynaud, "Pairwise Opposition" (or WV) and
>Margins.
>So why "Gross Loser"? Because it is the only version that meets
>Woodall's Plurality criterion.
I think that I understand your definitions. Can you prove that
Raynaud(GL) meets this criterion?
>
>Raynaud(GL) meets (mutual)Majority, all the Condorcet properties,
>Plurality, Clone Independence, of course mono-add-plump
>and mono-append, and NZIS (i.e. there are no zero-info. strategy
>incentives).
Personally, I don't care a lot about random fill incentive... but are
you
sure that it doesn't exist in this method? It seems like it would generate
some sort of queer incentive, but I don't know exactly what kind yet.
>
>Because it is far less vulnerable to Burying, I do actually prefer it to
>the "defeat droppers"!
>
Hang on a moment... when did we establish that Raynaud was far less
vulnerable to burying than defeat dropping methods?? I mean, if it is,
that's great, but I don't remember anyone demonstrating that...
my best,
James
>
>
>
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