Dear Ted! You wrote: > First point: High Approval score indicates broad consent that the > candidate is minimally acceptable. But it doesn't indicate highest > preference. Agreed.
> The main effect of Approval in DMC is to use it to discount the > pairwise defeats of candidates with less widespread support. But it > is still possible for a minority block of voters to express > "lesser-of-evil" preference among candidates approved by the majority. Yes. > Approval Cutoff also has an effect similar to AERLO/ATLO, which we > should also consider strongly desirable -- we want to encourage voters > to express a preference between approved candidates without fear of > hurting on or the other. Right. > If you end up ignoring that preference, > you're no better off than with straight Approval. I do not suggest to ignore pairwise preferences, only to give them no more meaning than approval information! > Second point: In the USA, at least, it may be more desirable for the > pairwise winner to have lower approval. This seems paradoxical, but > it tends to keep the winner from making overly radical changes. Sorry, but I think some radical changes in the US are just what the US (and the world) need :-) > The > US founders distrusted government enough that they put in checks and > balances to make the process *less* efficient. There is something similar in Germany: the federal government often depends on the agreement of a majority of the federal states' representatives, and this often leads to nothing happening at all... > Thirdly, choosing the Direct Support winner from P will tend to > discourage a more generous approval cutoff and encourage bullet > cutoffs. You're right back with something little better than > Plurality again. OK, I agree, that was a stupid suggestion and was only made because I wanted to bring in direct support in some non-random way for lovers of determinism. But now the main point: > Consider your DMC tie problem: > > 1 A>>B>C > 1 B>>C>A > 1 C>>A>B > 3 A=B=C > > With DMC, however, a fourth candidate will see the opportunity and > step in to fill the center -- if not in that election, then in a > future one: > > 1 A>>D>B>C > 1 B>>D>C>A > 1 C>>D>A>B > 3 A=B=C=D > Well, thank you for giving this example. Since it shows perfectly why I think that the Condorcet Winner (in this case D) is sometimes NOT a good choice at all! Most probably this D is just someone who has no program and says nothing but empty phrases which oppose noone. I at least don't think D should be elected here since s/he has too few approval and/or direct support! Yours, Jobst ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info