Hello, I wanted an opportunity to mention this, and Chris brings it up:
--- Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > 46 abc > 44 bca (sincere is bac) > 05 cab > 05 cba > > I agree that in a public political election with > reasonably well-informed voters and truncation > allowed, this is an unrealistic example if any method > that fails absolute > Later-no-harm is used. Actually, even when LNHarm is satisfied, it can be the case that the A voters are better off truncating. In this kind of scenario (i.e., where it's known that A>B pairwise, but not known how the A and B voters will vote), MMPO and the CDTT methods (which satisfy LNHarm in the three-candidate case) behave basically the same as WV. Specifically, although it's true that the A voters can't make A lose by giving B the second preference, they can make A win if they make the B voters believe that they're going to just vote "A." My hope is that at least the B voters, who expect to be beaten pairwise by A, would give A the second preference in order to make A the decisive winner. The alternative is that (using MMPO or the CDTT) also C is a potential winner. Kevin Venzke Découvrez le nouveau Yahoo! Mail : 250 Mo d'espace de stockage pour vos mails ! Créez votre Yahoo! Mail sur http://fr.mail.yahoo.com/ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info