Russ,

Ok, let me consider CDTT methods in this context.

--- Russ Paielli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> What is too complicated? Nobody knows the exact answer to that question, 
> of course, but let me tell you what I think.
> 
> I think you can forget about any method that cannot be explained in two 
> or three sentences understandable by persons of average intelligence. 
> Maybe that can be stretched to four sentences, but that's really pushing it.

Suppose there are no majority-strength cycles. Those are supposed to be
rare, right? So say there are none.

Then CDTT,FPP can be defined as "elect the FPP winner, except that when more
than half of the voters rank X>Y, then Y can't win." Or perhaps better, "Elect
the candidate with the most first preferences over whom no majority ranks
any other candidate."

There can just be an asterisk for cycles. (And in the three-candidate case, a 
cycle can be simply ignored.)

> I think you can forget about any non-deterministic methods, cardinal 
> ratings methods other than approval, Condorcet methods involving defeat 
> dropping, and anything involving bubble sorting, candidate withdrawal, 
> or automatic vote changing and recounting (e.g., AERLO).

Ok, so that rules out CDTT,RandomCandidate and CDTT,RandomBallot. That
still leaves CDTT,FPP, CDTT,DSC (DSC being a kind of clone-proofed FPP),
CDTT,MMPO (Condorcetish but no defeat dropping), and CDTT,IRV.

Kevin Venzke



        

        
                
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