Markus--
You said:
Then I proposed the following criterion in 1997:
If p(wv)[A,B] > V/2 and p(wv)[B,A] < V/2, then candidate B must be elected with zero probability.
Steve Eppley proposed the following criterion in 2000:
If d[A,B] > V/2 and p(wv)[B,A] < V/2, then candidate B must be elected with zero probability.
I reply:
Yes, but to outdo a majority pairwise vote, it's necessary for that MPV to be in a cycle of MPVs _all of which are at least as strong as it is_.
That's how my majority rule definition differs from your criterion and from Steve's Beatpath Criterion.
By the way, Steve's Beatpath Criterion is very useful for determining compliance with the majority defenisive strategy criteria. A method that meets BC meets all the majority defensive strategy criteria. I've never defined BC in a universallly applicable way, because I've only used it for testing rank methods for compliance with the majority defensive strategy criteria.
Mike Ossipoff
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