Curt,
--- Curt Siffert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Operating from the following assumptions:
>
> 1) There is never a viable reason to select a candidate other than the
> Condorcet Winner if a CW exists
> 2) Any voting criterion that is inherently incompatible with electing a
> Condorcet Winner should be discarded
Heh!
> 3) All Condorcet "tiebreakers" pass some criteria and fail others
>
> I am just curious if there is a *set* of Condorcet methods, such that
> all popular criteria are met by at least one of the methods.
I wonder what criteria you have in mind. The best Condorcet methods seem
to be Schulze, Tideman, and Jobst's River method. Some criteria aren't met
if winning votes aren't used as the measure of defeat strength.
> Then the population could be told that the election will select a
> Condorcet Winner if one exists, and if not, one of the tiebreaking
> methods would be selected randomly. It would be better if they all met
> the Smith or Schwartz criteria.
>
> It remove the motivation for targetted tactical voting if there was
> always a chance the tactical voting would backfire.
I think this won't help much... The three methods above behave identically
given a three-candidate cycle, and most strategy examples I've seen only
use three candidates.
Kevin Venzke
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