Dear Forest! You wrote:
> I suggest picking the winning alternative by random ballot from BP, > rather than from P when there is serious potential for something like > the > > 49 C > 24 B (sincere B>A) > 27 A>B > > scenario. I guess you assume that all ranked candidates are approved, right? If so, sincere votes will give DMC:A and DFC:A or B, while strategic votes will give DMC,DFC:B. However, the A voters have a simple counter-strategy which does not even require them to change their ranking: they only have to vote A>>B instead of A>B, which would give DMC:C and DFC:B or C, which is worse than the original result for the B voters. So perhaps we could live without the extra complication of determining beatpaths... Jobst ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info