James replying to Jobst... Jobst: > >Then I'm sorry to have misrepresented what your main point is.
No problem. Of course, you weren't too far off; strategy resistance is a big part of my concern. I said: >> My main purpose in using cardinal information is to incorporate >> preference strength into defeat strength, and thus to protect defeats >that >> consist of many strong preferences. By this, I mean that they should not only be protected under sincere conditions, but that they should also be protected against strategic incursion by those who disagree with the defeat. James: > >> Oh, wonderful! Are you fully aware of my "approval-weighted pairwise" >> method (AWP)? AWP is basically the same thing as CWP, except for the >fact >> that only two cardinal scores can be given: 1 and 0. I suggest that it >has >> anti-strategic properties that are comparable to CWP, and that it is >> significantly more strategy-resistant than DMC/RAV, AM, margins, and WV. Jobst: >I know, and that is a great pro for AWP. That's also why I essentially >proposed something like AWP as "grand compromise" half a year ago. Yes, I remember that, now. October 11, 2004. (I proposed AWP on June 8, 2004.) On September 6, 2004, you also proposed something close to what I've lately been calling it S/WPO, for "strong/weak preference option". Apparently something similar was proposed by Steve Eppley back in the "old days" of the list. Jobst: >But >DFC and DMC are definitely much more simple DMC/RAV has pretty simple rules, I'll give you that. I'm not sure that DFC (democratic fair choice) is especially simple... Would you mind giving me a maximally short definition of it? (Sorry if that means that you have to repeat yourself.) Jobst: >without having considerably >more strategy problems, This has yet to be established, I think. my best, James ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info