James replying to Mike... >For the offensive strategy to succeed, in addition to no counterstrategy >being used, and in addition to A pairwise beating C, in addition to the >B >voters preferring A to C, it's also necessary that A be the sincere >Plurality winner. That isn't necessary for IRV to have its problem. ... >I've just posted a list of 5 conditions needed for offensive >order-reversal >to do what Plurality or IRV can do at any time, automatically. >One of those conditions was that A be the sincere Plurailty winner. >So, if A wins by offensive order-reversal in a wv election, after wv has >replaced Plurality, and if someone says "Hey, they stole the election by >offensive order-reversal. I want good old Plurality back!", then one can >point out that that person that Plurality, under sincere voting, would >have >elected A anyway.
I don't understand what makes you say this. Candidate B wasn't the plurality winner in the example that I gave you, and yet the burying strategy by the B supporters is successful. Here's the example again. Ex. 1: Sincere preferences expressed: 46: A>B>C 44: B>A>C 5: C>A>B 5: C>B>A Ex. 1: Pairwise comparisons: A>B 51-49 A>C 90-10 B>C 90-10 Ex. 1 winner: A Ex. 2: Expressed preferences (some insincere): 46: A>B>C 44: B>C>A (sincere was B>A>C) 5: C>A>B 5: C>B>A Ex. 2: Pairwise comparisons: A>B 51-49 C>A 54-46 B>C 90-10 Ex. 2 winner: B Sincerely, James ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info