Kevin--
I'd said:
But LNH does have one use: It's one way of avoiding James' co-operation/defection dilemma. But that problem can also be well dealt-with via ATLO, and so there's no justification for giving up what needs to be given up in order to get LNH, as a way of avoiding the co-operation/defection dilemma.
You say:
Really?
I reply:
Yes really.
You continue:
Can ATLO make it so that given the following sincere preferences, the B>C faction has no incentive to bullet vote?
I reply:
Yes. If the C voters appy ATLO below C, and rank C 1st and B 2nd, with their ATLO line between C and B, then the B voters will have no incentive to bullet vote.
Of course if the C voters and B voters aren't sure which of {B,C} is the CW, and neither wants to elect A, and neither wants to be had by the other, then both the B voters and the C voters should rank B and C, in sincere order of preference, applying ATLO immediately below their favorite.
Here are the preference orderings of your example:
49 A 24 B>C 27 C>B
You continued:
Under WV, the B>C voters can get B elected if they vote only for B, whereas they give the election to C if they give C a ranking.
I reply:
I thought you were talking about wv with ATLO. With ATLO wv, if the C voters vote C in 1st place and B in 2nd place, with the ATLO line between C and B, the B voters, if they bullet vote, will succeed only in electing A. If they vote sincerely they get C, whom they like better than A.
You continued:
My conclusion is that there is no way to satisfy SDSC and address the defection problem without electing C at least as often as B on the following ballots:
I reply:
I have no idea what that means. But SD, SSD, BeatpathWinner/CSSD, MAM, and RP meet SDSC. And, with ATLO, those ballots that you list below wouldn't happen, given the preferences that you listed above.
The ballots that you listed:
49 A 24 B 27 C>B
Mike Ossipoff
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