Kevin--
I'd said:
Consider any standard wv truncation example:
40: A (B>C preference truncated) 25: B 35: CB
Maybe you might want to consider your best proposal?
You replied:
...Why on earth would the A voters truncate the B>C preference? This causes C to obtain a great chance of winning when otherwise it is a decisive B win.
I reply:
Truncation isn't always strategic. Maybe the ballot is very long, and some people are in a hurry to finish voting and do other things. Maybe someone is lazy. Maybe someone doesn't know much about some of the candidates. Maybe someone is refusing, on principle, to vote for someone.
Those don't sound to me like good reasons to not elect the CW. If someone refuses to vote for a candidate out of principle, that could make that candidate lose with any method. No method can always undo the result of not helping one's best compromise. But wv sometimes can, when the result is a cycle. WV can still elect the CW under those conditions, and that seems a good thing. Even though I myself would truncate on prinicple in every election.
Besides, what about the people who truncated for those other nonstrategic reasons. It's good that wv will sometimes not fail to elect the CW as a result.
I'd said:
Your method has a truncation CW failure that PC doesn't have.
Well, the scenario above shows that if voters truncate the CW, they can get someone they like less. That isn't your point, I'm sure.
I reply:
But if they're truncating for one of those nonstrategic reasons that I named, then it isn't necessary to teach them a lesson for offensive strategy, and it's best to elect the CW, as wv will often do, in spite of truncation, when the Simpson-Kramer version you propose wouldn't.
You said:
I don't understand why you say "halfway" if you're not referring to the "price" of indecisiveness and poorer Condorcet efficiency.
I meant that there's a 50% chance of the truncation being regretted in that defection. But, of course, if it isn't regretted, that's because the CW wins, and that isn't bad.
I don't have serious objection to that Simpson-Kramer version. It's largely a subjective matter of opinion which is better, that or PC. I myself prefer PC, but I don't strongly object to that Simpson-Kramer version.
You said:
I don't propose BP in this case because part of the point of CDTT,RB is to
address the defection problem. When only majority-strength defeats are
regarded, then adding a preference can create a defeat, but it can't reverse
the direction of one. That means voters don't need to worry that adding a
new preference could turn that candidate into the CW (who would automatically
have to win, in a Condorcet method).
I reply:
Ok, I hadn't considered new methods or variations, other than ATLO, to get rid of the defection problem. If CDTT,RB can do so without some high price, that's desirable.
But when the defection succeeds in wv, isn't that in a cycle, rather than with one candidate beating everyone?
You said:
A big reason I don't mind the indecisiveness, is that the voters have the power to avoid indecision: They can vote non-cyclic majority-strength wins.
I reply:
But indecisiveness would likely adversely affect a method's chance of acceptance by the public.
You said:
Maybe I should note that I want to use Markus' BC with Random Ballot
You mean the winners, before RB, are the candidates who don't have a majority beatpath to them that isn't in a cycle of majority defeats? Then apply RB to the winners?
You continued:
, because using Steve's BC is not monotonic. I can give an example if desired.
I reply:
Steve mentioned a Beatpath Criterion Method based on BC. If I remember correctly, it would elect the candidates who could be elected without violating BC. Then, if (and for as long as) that results in a tie, the same method would be re-applied to the tie. It was shown to be nonmonotonic.
But BC is a criterion, rather than a method, though Steve once proposed a method based on BC.
Mike Ossipoff
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