On Sat, 2005-08-13 at 18:48 -0400, Dave Ketchum wrote: > NOT at all clear that 2-party domination is as evil as some claim.
This is a really good point to consider. We probably need to discuss the specific characteristics of the two-party system we rail about in order to judge if a system is bad or good. In the case of plurality, the character of the two party system is such that candidates are motivated to optimize for 50%+1, alienating the other 49.whatever percent of the population that makes a good scapegoat. That leads to a two-hump distribution of candidates along a largely unidirectional political spectrum. The most polarizing issues are used as tools to divide the electorate into two halves (e.g. abortion, gay rights, separation of church and state, business owners/managers vs labor, private vs public sector). In the case of IRV, it arguably gets worse, because it becomes possible for weak candidates to run without being spoilers, but strong candidates are in just as much danger to split the vote. Hence, the pressure will still be on to cluster into two idealogical camps. Even when the threat is mild, voters would still be nervous. Hence, I think that's why burying is common tactic in Australia. My understanding of the simulations is that you still have two humps in the idealogical distribution curve, but that they are further apart, so the zig-zag characteristic of switching between the two parties is actually exaggerated under IRV. However, two parties clustered near the center of the spectrum may not be such a bad thing, so long as those parties don't have too many unfair advantages like the ones we see today (e.g. ballot access barriers, "safe" districts, etc). Those two parties should be in genuine fear of their competition, much in the same way that things work in a healthy free market (e.g. Dell and HP in the PC market, FedEx and UPS in private package delivery). There are only so many brands that people can keep in their heads, so having two dominant "brands"/parties of candidates may not be so bad. That said, free markets don't typically settle long on just two players, and when they do, there very well could be some unfair advantages at work. William Riker wrote a paper titled "The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science" in the American Political Science Review in December, 1982 which covers the topic. It's a good coverage of some of the more insidious aspects of the system; including the disincentives to smart candidates who don't fit in one of the two dominate parties. It's a good reminder of why a two-party duopoly is usually bad. Regardless, I have yet to see a convincing case that Condorcet methods naturally lead to two-party duopoly. Rob ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info