Here is another question - will DMC lead to 2-party domination, or not? To really answer this, it would help to understand optimal voting strategy in DMC, which is probably beyond reach.
However, you may be able to just think about 3-candidate DMC elections and thereby answer the question with a fair degree of confidence... --- If you check the CRV web page subpages http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/TarrIrv.html http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/IncentToExagg.html you can see arguments about why IRV and Condorcet-based-on-">only"-rankings should lead to 2-party domination (there are also other arguments...) which could serve as a starting point to attack the same question about DMC. --- here is another: consider the horrible "DH3 pathology" described at http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/DH3.html which afflicts Borda and many Condorcet methods... does it also afflict DMC? Again answering this requires some understanding of voting strategy in DMC. However, if the voters use the "obvious" exaggeration-plan (for A-supporters: A>D>B>C and approve A only) then it seems to me under DMC D wins, right? This suggests DMC is killed by the DH3 pathology. And by "killed" I mean bad news, you really should regard this extremely seriously. wds ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
