Dear Warren! You wrote:
>>1. Allows to distinguish important from minor preferences. > --range does too, only better. OK. >>2. Immunity from second place complaints. Unlike in MinMax and >>Beatpath, the DMC winner always defeats the candidate which would win >> if the winner were not present. > --nice. Also true of range. I'm sorry you're wrong here: If ballots are voters A points B points 60 60 40 40 0 100 then B wins although she is obviously defeated by A, the obvious 2nd place winner. >>15. [related to 3] Defeats other methods. In every situation, the DMC >>winner is either identical to or defeats the winner of each of the >>following methods: Approval Voting, Condorcet//Approval, >>Smith//Approval, DFC, TAWS. > --I consider this criterion 15 to be artificial. No matter what ranked > ballot method you > have (X) I con construct a new one Y so the Ywinner always is same as or > beats the Xwinner > pairwise. In particular I can make X=DMC to get Y=a method that pairwise > beats DMC... > This fact suggests to me that this criterion is meaningless... I would say that when explicitly comparing two seriously suggested methods, it is well significant if the winner of the first always defeats the winner of the second. >>6. Robustness against "noise" candidates.. cloneproof... > --also true of range. Could you say more precisely what you mean here? >>7. Easy and transparent algorithm. > --way truer of range... I agree. >>8. Robustness against counting errors. Since DMC uses only the >>ordering by approval score and not the precise approval scores, and >>uses only the direction of the pairwise defeats... > --sounds kind of silly claim to me, and anyhow is truer of range since range > has > fewer tie-possibilities that can matter. Thanks for taking me serious and calling me silly :-) >>9. Avoids margins/winning votes debate. > --truer of range... True, yes, but what do you mean by "truer"? >>10. Avoids a discussion of "cycles"... > --also true of range... and probably truer... see above. > M1: interchange order of two neighboring candidates in your rank-order > vote ==> > (A>B becomes B>A) cannot decrease B's chance of winning, cannot increase > A's. > M2: minimally change your vote so now approve of A ==> cannot decrease A's > chance of winning. > Which of these are true? Both? Yes, both. Check out for yourself, it's quite easy. >>17. It is resistant to the burying strategy that plagues some >>Condorcet methods. This is related to reason number 9. > --could you be more precise? That was Forest's claim, I haven't thought about this so far. Yours, Jobst ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info