At 07:11 PM 9/14/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course, among the things that would happen should an accurate polling be
sufficient to successfully strategically vote would be the creation
of voters who would no longer supply accurate information to the poll takers.
Many of those discussing election methods assume that disciplined
coordination of voters on a large scale is impractical. This is true
under present conditions.
However, if my own work is successful, voters will organize outside
the public political process in such a way as to form organizations
making recommendations that are trustworthy by design. (That is, the
recommendations are made by those enjoying the highest collected
trust, and are confirmed and passed down through representatives
personally chosen on a scale where the voter probably knows the rep
personally, or at least has been willing to place trust in the person.)
The organizations would be advisory only, so the Free Association
concepts are possible. What these do is to maximize the possibility
of consensus. Factions know that if they hold to a narrow view, they
will weaken the support for that view, because there will be opposing
factions. If they can find consensus positions, they will be far more
powerful. And, because of the DP structure, factions will quickly
know exactly how successful they have been at finding such positions.
So disciplined voting is entirely possible. Basically, FA/DP is a
generic solution to half of the generic governmental problem, the
communications half. It is not a control mechanism, FA concepts
guarantee that control remains with the individual members at all
times. Power is not concentrated in FA, except for the power to
advise, and even that is moderated through legions of independent
proxies. It should be *extremely* hard to corrupt, so hard, in fact,
that a special interest would be better advised to join the FA and
seek consensus solutions within it.
http://beyondpolitics.org/wiki
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