Forest--
You wrote:
How about Majority Choice Approval ? Like RV it is strategically equivalent
to Approval, but allows for more expressiveness than Approval.
I reply:
But can a voter give that favoriteness vote to two or more candidates?
Because, if not, then MCA would fail FBC. And if so, the meaning of _the
favorite_ of a majorilty, as opposed to an Approval count, would be diluted,
especially for the public that it's being proposed to. Allowing more than
one "favorite" vote, which could be given to a nonfavorite compromise too,
could complicate the method for the publc that it is proposed to.
Maybe, even then, MCA is a little simpler than MDDA, but not much simpler:
"A candidate is disqualified if another candidate is ranked over him/her by
a majority. The undisqualified candidate ranked by the most people wins."
[end of MDDA definition]
(As you said, if everyone is majority-defeated, then no one is
majority-disqualified)
I don't know if that's any more complicated or wordy than MCA. And it meets
SFC & SDSC.
Additionally, it doesn't attract the fallacious 1-person-1-vote objection
that always besets Approval.
You wrote:
It [MCA] has the nice explicit reference to Majority: If any candidate is
marked "favored" on a majority (more than fifty percent) of the ballots,
then the one with the greatest majority wins.
I reply:
True.
MDDA matches MCA's majority favorite advantage:
In MDDA, if a majority rank X alone in 1st place, that gives X a majority
defeat against every one of the other candidates, resulting in the
disqualification of everyone but X. If you rank X in 1st place, maybe with
other candidates, then you're helping X have a majority defeat against
everyone except for the others you rank in 1st place.
And indifference is the only thing that could make MDDA fail Condorcet's
Criterion. Without at least a little indifference, a CW has majorities
against everyone. One could argue that the more indifferently-supported a CW
is, the less important it is. The only way for that CC failure to need only
very little indifference, would be if it's a very close pairwise race.
You wrote:
Also, do I remember correctly that MDDA starts by eliminating all candidates
defeated by a majority of voters, and if there are any left, electing the
most approved of these, otherwise falling back to most approved of all the
candidates?
I reply:
Yes, that's MDDA. In its standard definition, in MDDA a ballot gives an
Approval vote to (only) all the candidates that it ranks.
Mike Ossiopff
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