I wish you guys would stop bringing politics into this. I like Nader, but frankly would never want him as President. Beatpath is as good as any method that counts from the pairwise matrix instead of ballots, but I would never want it to be used to count my ranked ballot.
I was really hoping this list was for discussions about methods, not personal opinions. > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > ] On Behalf Of MIKE OSSIPOFF > Sent: Monday, October 03, 2005 8:31 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [EM] Rob reply: FBC vs CC. SFC. RV., > > Rob-- > > I'd said: > > >A voter will favorite-bury if, for that voter, the important > goal is to > >keep an unacceptable candidate from winning, and if > favorite-burial will > >increase the probability of accomplishing that. > > I posit that very few voters will be in that predicament. It is my > experience that most voters prefer candidates with a chance to win. > People that like to be part of quixotic movements are > exceedingly rare. > > I reply: > > Thank you for proving my point. You believe your tv when it > tells you that > only the Democrat could beat the Republican, and that to > support someone > other than that media- anointed, corporate-bought Democrat is > "quixotic". > You feel isolated, believinig that only you and some tiny > subset of the > population want something better than Kerry. After all, > doesn't the tv > represent and portray the true America? So of course you > obediently vote for > the Democrat, however dishonest he is, and however odious his > policies and > record. > > There are people with progressive goals, who prefer Nader to > the Democrat. > As you point out, most of those people feel compelled to vote for the > Democrat. > > I have merely suggested that they'll do the same when the > voting system is > BeatpathWinner. > > If I haven't made myself clear, FBC is important so that > those giveaway > progressives won't feel compelled to keep concealing what they want. > > When I referred to acceptable and unacceptable candidates, I > clarified that > the lesser-of-2-evils progressives have a very different > notion about what > is acceptable, as compared to what I consider acceptable. > When you talk to > such a progressive, they make it clear that the Republican is the > unacceptable, and that anyone better than the Republican is > acceptable. It > was such voters that I was talking about. > > So, as I said, these people, if their only goal is to ensure that an > unacceptable (Republican) won't win, will do what it takes to > minimize the > probability of that happening. > > And, aside from that, the number who will favorite-bury for > that reason is > further increased when voters who don't understand the count > method don't > even know how unlikely it is that they could regret not > favorite-burying. I > covered that in my previous message. Then it won't just be > people who will > do whatever it takes to minimize the probability of a > Republican win. It > will also include people who'd only do that if they felt that the FBC > failure might be likely. > > You continued: > > > Moreover, the cases where sincere voting regret are rare. > > I reply: > > As I said: > > 1. That's irrelevant. I'm talking about people whose only goal in the > election is to keep the Republican from winning, to minimize > the probability > that the Republican will win, whatever it takes. > > 2. And someone who doesn't know how the count works might not > know how > likely it is that they could regret not favorite-burying. > > You continued: > > Combine that > with the innate desire that I think people who vote contrarian ballots > have to "make a statement", and I suspect we're talking about a > diminishingly small number of people who will reverse order. > > I reply: > > What we have to go on is that the practice is near-universal > in Plurality > elections, and also common in IRV elections. Yes, the > evidence I've prsented > about Australian voting strategy is "anecdotal" because no > one has done a > scientific study--I've onlyheard from an increasing number of > Australians > who say that favorite-burial isn't uncommon in IRV. > People fear that they'd "waste [their] vote" if they didn't > vote one of the > Big-Two party candidates in 1st place, with their favorite > ranked somewhere > below. What does it take to convince you? Ok, a scientific > study. Maybe > someday someone will conduct one. In the meantime, I've heard > from a number > of Australians. > > You wrote: > > I'm trying to see how this: > "If a Condorcet candidate exists, and if a majority prefers this > candidate to another candidate, then the other candidate > should not win > if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies any > preferences." > > .../always/ leads to this: > > > "SFC requires that the majority of voters who prefer the Condorcet > candidate to another particular candidate vote sincerely (neither > falsify nor truncate their preferences), and it also requires that no > other voter falsifies preferences" > > I reply: > > First, please note that I don't recognize either of those > wordings as mine. > So, if one doesn't lead to the either, and neither was said > by me, then what > does that say about SFC? Nothing. > > That first SFC definition that you quoted is definitely not > my wording. Your > 2nd statement of course is not a definition of SFC, and so > there would be no > reason to expect it to mean the same as the previous wording > that someone > intended as a definition of SFC. > > I would probably say that SFC _stipulates_ sincere voting by > that majority, > rather than using the word "require". That's because, as I > use the term, a > criterion's requirement is something else. SFC's requirement > is that B not > win. That that majority vote sincerely is a stipulation that > is part of > SFC's premise. > > In any case, you needn't expect an intended definition of SFC > to mean the > same as a wording of part of SFC's premise, which is only part of SFC. > > Anyway, here's SFC: > > If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to > candidate B, and vote sincerely, then B shouldn't win. > > [end of SFC definition] > > Please, in the future, when challenging SFC, refer to _my_ > wording of its > definition. > > You continued: > > MDDA would seem to encourage truncation in rare situations. > > I reply: > > Perhaps, but MDDA also encourages truncation in common > situations. With > ordinary MDDA, you should rank only those candidates to whom > you want to > give an Approval vote. > > And, aside from that, if it's an acceptable/unacceptable > situation, even > with Deluxe MDDA, which has a separate Approval cutoff and > power truncation, > you should power truncate all the unacceptables. > > You continued: > > I agree that SFC is a very important criterion, if perhaps misnamed. > > I reply: > > The name refers to the fact that the criterion is about > plausible conditions > under which, with complying methods, voters need no strategy > in order to > accomplish the specified goal. > > You continued: > > I'm sure there were long discussions about naming it during the long > period where I wasn't very active on the list. > > I reply: > > Some people objected to the name, on the grounds that it's > been proven that > no nonprobabilistic method is entirely strategy-free. But > that objection > isn't valid, because the criterion is about conditions under > which voters > can accomplish a specific goal without strategy. > > You continued: > > This may be a seemingly minor quibble, but I raise this because I > consider the two SFC quotes above to both be very important criteria, > and I'm trying to figure out how both apply to MDDA. > > I reply: > > I don't claim that those two quotes apply to MDDA, but I do > claim that my > SFC definition applies to MDDA, in the sense that MDDA meets > that criterion. > > I'd said: > > >Realistically, I propose RV, with more rating-levels than Approval. > > Range is a political stillborn. This example kills it: > > 100 voters, two candidates, scale of 0-10: > > 90 voters: A=7, B=6 > 10 voters: A=0, B=10 > > A:630 > B:640 > > B wins, even though 90% of voters prefer A to B. > > I reply: > > But how is that a problem? The A voters didn't feel strongly > about A vs B, > and they therefore chose to not dominate the choice. They > chose to let the > choice be made by someone who felt more strongly than they did. > > For a 2-candidate race, obviously neither RV, Approval, > BeatpathWinner, > MDDA, nor any other improved voting system is needed. But all > of those > methods work fine with two candidates. > > You continued: > > There is no possible way Range will ever get serious support > > I reply: > > RV is well known and well-accepted in the Olympics. Everyone > is familiar > with being asked to rate things up to 10. RV has a big > head-start on new > methods such as BeatpathWinner, Approval, or IRV. > > You continue: > > , given that > weakness. > > I reply: > > No one is forced to vote sincerely if they want to maximize > their voting > power, their power to maximize their expectation. > > Of course BeatpathWinner has advantages (Condorcet's Criterion, Smith > Criterion, WDSC, SDSC, but especially SFC & GSFC,). But that > isn't the same > as saying that RV has a serious problem. Anyway, > BeatpathWinner fails FBC. > > You continue: > If it manages to pass constitutional muster, it goes against > what I suspect is the instinct of most voters out there, including > myself. > > I reply: > > The instinct to not let a set of voters indicate the strength > of their > preference, choosing to vote a weak preference in order to let more > choice-power be had by people to whom the choice is more important? > Shouldn't they be free to do as they wish? They could strategize, to > maximize their applied strength, if they wished to. > > Mike Ossipoff > > _________________________________________________________________ > Is your PC infected? Get a FREE online computer virus scan > from McAfeeR > Security. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963 > > ---- > Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > for list info > ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info