With RV, not only does a majority always have the power to make their unique
favorite win, but they always have the power to do so without reversing any
preferences.
In fact, more generally, if a majority prefer X to Y, then they have a way
of voting that ensures that Y won't win, without any of them reversing a
preference.
That's the Weak Defensive Strategy Criterion (WDSC). RV meets WDSC.
WDSC is met by RV, Approval (which is an RV version), wv Condorcet, and
Bucklin. Probably a few other methods too. Most methods don't meet WDSC.
Sure, it would be nice if, by the mere fact of voting their unique favorite
over everyone else, a majority could make it win. But, to meet that and a
few other desirable criteria, one needs a pairwise-count method.
Pairwise-count methods are more problematic to propose to the public and get
enacted. I'm not saying it's impossible, because I'm aware that a state
legislator is considering proposing Condorcet in his state.
Besides, if that majority really want to make their favorite win, then of
course they can do that in RV. If that is their desire, then why should they
give points to other candidates?
Yes, it would be nice if they could fully vote Favorite over Compromise,
while fully voting Compromise over worst. If you want that then you want a
pairwise-count method, and wv Condorcet is a good one. MDDA and MDDB are
also good ones, more suitable than Condorcet for political elections,
because they meet FBC.
Still, RV seems a much easier and more winnable proposal, due to its
simplicly, public familiarity, and public populariy.
And Weak Majority Criterion compliance and WDSC compliance do much to make
up for RV not meeting MC.
Mike Ossipoff
_________________________________________________________________
Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search!
http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
----
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
