Markus Schulze wrote (13 March 2003): > Steve wrote: > > As for your conjecture that MAM and BeatpathWinner would > > probably perform about the same in a simulation that adds > > a randomly ranked candidate (or, equivalently, a > > simulation that retallies after deleting a random loser, > > which might be easier to write), I guess I'd be willing to > > make a small wager that MAM would do slightly better than > > BeatpathWinner, based on the other random voting > > simulations that show MAM winners beat BeatpathWinner > > winners pairwise more often than vice versa. > > The MinMax method has the property that an additional > candidate can change the winner without being elected only > when the new candidate pairwise beats the original winner.
I assume that by "MinMax" Markus means one of the variations that measures each candidate's largest pairwise "defeat." The property does not hold if the method elects the candidate whose largest pairwise opposition is smallest (assuming votes can express pairwise indifference). That property doesn't sound like a good proxy for IIA; else it would be an indicator that Minmax is the best method. Minmax fails clone independence and local independence of irrelevant alternatives, which are satisfied by MAM, so it seems silly to argue that Minmax is a good IIA benchmark. Markus' message had nothing more to say about MinMax (which is not the same as Smith//MinMax, which Markus went on to discuss but which doesn't share that property). So I don't see the relevance of that property to the discussion of MAM vs. BeatpathWinner. > Random simulations by Norman Petry in 2000 demonstrated that > the winner of the beat path method is almost always the > Smith//MinMax winner. As I recall, Norm made other errors besides the one pointed out by Rob LeGrand (13 Mar 2003, "[EM] Smith//MinMax"). Rob wrote: > I believe the incidences of agreement among > Smith//MinMax, plain MinMax, beatpath and > Ranked Pairs are all well over 90% for > 15 candidates or fewer. Norm Petry was > randomly generating pairwise matrices, > not voter preferences, driving the incidence > of Condorcet candidates down and disagreement > among Condorcet methods up. Also, randomly generating pairwise matrices can produce some matrices that are impossible for real votes to produce, if each element of the matrix represents a "winning votes" count rather than a "margin" count. (In other words, the number of votes that rank x over y, rather than the number that rank x over y minus the number that rank y over x.) It's been so long that I don't recall if Norm explained how he avoided impossible matrices, or if he provided an argument why randomly generated matrices would appear in the same proportion as the matrices produced by randomly generated votes (and if not why this can't lead to biased results). I'm not convinced Norm implemented the correct definitions of BeatpathWinner or RankedPairs(wv) in his simulations. If my memory is correct, Norm indicated at one point that he implemented an old definition that Markus posted long before, which was not equivalent to BeatpathWinner. The huge discrepancy between Smith//Minmax and RP suggests he didn't program RP correctly. And I don't recall if Norm said how his implementation of RP broke ties among same size majorities, which can't be done according to spec given only the pairwise matrix.) > Therefore, I would give a small wager that the > beat path method does it better. Markus originally conjectured that MAM and BeatpathWinner would perform about the same on IIA. He appears to have changed his mind. Perhaps after I posted a reason why I'd wager MAM would do better, he felt he should try to manufacture a counter-argument. > For example, when there are 15 candidates then the > Smith//MinMax winner and the winner of the beat path method > are identical in 91.7% while the Smith//MinMax winner and > the Ranked Pairs winner are identical in only 41.8% of all > situations. My own simulations directly compared MAM and BeatpathWinner using randomly generated votes, and produced data that conflict considerably with Norm's, and I place more faith in my results than his. (Apparently Rob LeGrand also has data that conflict with Norm's.) Here are some relevant excerpts from my data. The third column shows the percentage of scenarios where the MAM winner beat the BeatpathWinner winner pairwise, and the fourth column shows the percentage of scenarios where the BeatpathWinner winner beat the MAM winner pairwise: #Alts #Voters MAM>BPW BPW>MAM 15 100 9.756% 1.319% 15 101 5.290% 0.277% 15 1000 13.23% 2.08% (The rest of my data can be seen at my web pages at www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley by following the appropriate link. There's also a link to a comparison of MAM vs. Instant Runoff, which shows MAM winners beat IRV winners pairwise more often than vice versa. For example, for 15 alternatives and 100 voters, MAM>IRV is 28.71% and IRV>MAM is 9.43%.) Assuming Markus correctly quoted Norm's stats, they imply that MAM and BeatpathWinner disagree in about half of the 15-alternatives scenarios, whereas my stats show they disagree in far less than half. Thus Rob LeGrand and I believe Norm's data is flawed. I could run simulations comparing the agreements of Smith//Minmax or Minmax with MAM and with BeatpathWinner, but I don't accept Markus' argument that that would shed light on which method provides the most independence from irrelevant alternatives. I think simulations directly comparing MAM and BeatpathWinner, such as mine excerpted above, provide a real reason to believe MAM provides more independence than BeatpathWinner, by showing that MAM winners beat BeatpathWinner winners pairwise more often than vice versa. Directly comparing MAM and the BeatpathWinner by the IIA performance simulations that Markus suggested be tried would of course be more definitive. If a clearer argument is provided that simulations comparing the agreement of Smith//Minmax or Minmax with MAM and with BeatpathWinner would be useful, I'll try to find time to do it. (Rob's message hints that he or someone besides Norm has done it. Is that data available? If so, I could execute a small part of the simulation to compare a few data points, and stop early if my data points are about the same as Rob's.) If anyone decides to program the IIA performance simulations, I recommend doing it by deleting a loser (the "contraction consistency" test) rather than adding a new alternative (the "expansion consistency" test). With random voting, an added alternative has nearly a 50% chance of beating the previous winner pairwise, and I'd guess an added alternative would have about a 40% chance of becoming the new winner (which is hardly an irrelevant alternative) which means many scenarios would have to be discarded. To speed the tests, I think it makes sense to reuse the votes n-1 times, where n is the number of alternatives, by deleting each of the losers (such that only one is deleted at a time) instead of deleting only one randomly picked loser. (Also, the votes could be reused even more by deleting randomly selected subsets of the losers.) One might also consider testing IIA performance by checking how often deletion of the last-place alternative causes the winner to change. An argument for this test is that the last-place alternative ought to be the "least relevant" alternative. Two arguments against this test are (1) being ranked last by a method is not necessarily the same thing as being least relevant, and (2) IIA says nothing about "least relevant" alternatives. MAM would trounce BeatpathWinner on this test, since MAM satisfies LIIA and BeatpathWinner does not. (A corollary of LIIA satisfaction is that MAM's winner will not change if the last-place alternative is deleted.) I assume Markus will argue that this is not a reasonable test of IIA performance. :-) Did Peyton Young provide a clear argument anywhere to explain his claim that LIIA is a "slight weakening" of IIA? Presumably, Young thought LIIA is more than just a curiosity. Perhaps we should ask him. I think he's currently at Johns Hopkins (www.jhu.edu), or maybe at the Brookings Institution. -- Steve Eppley _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com