--- Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > 20 ABCD > > 20 BCAD > > 20 CABD > > 13 DABC > > 13 DBCA > > 13 DCAB > > > then we would have > > 60 A=B=C>D > 13 D>A>B>C > 13 D>B>C>A > 13 D>C>A>B > > The max opposition would still be 60 for D, but A,B, > and C's max > opposition would be only 39, leaving plenty of room > for expressing some > preference among the clones.
True, but I don't much like the general strategy that seems to come from this system. ABC supporters can get punished by ordering ABC, and D supporters have no reason not to order ABC at least randomly. Truncation makes no sense for D supporters. (I'm not positive, but I suspect D supporters have incentive to "bury" competitive candidates. Ranking a single candidate last guarantees that you contribute negatively to his MMPO score.) It's kind of the opposite of what we were recently discussing, where unranked candidates would be disapproved; here, approved candidates are likely to be unranked (unordered). (Incidentally, I was reading messages from two years ago and I was amazed to see that you (Forest) first came up with the "unranked candidates are disapproved" idea.) I'm not sure whether there is a big advantage to using MMPO with ranked ballots as opposed to approval ballots, especially if sincere ranking isn't safe. One idea that occurs to me, to prevent the election of rogues/turkeys, is to factor MMPO into the pairwise matrix in the following simple fashion: Add to each cell the largest value in that column. That's a decent way of considering "offensive strength" as well as the MMPO "defensive" measurement. Applying this to the original ballots, I get: A B C D A . 132 132 120< B 132 . 132 120< C 132 132 . 120< D 105^105^105^ . So D still loses. Have you done any kind of "utility experiments" comparing Condorcet and "dyadic Condorcet" of various resolutions? The results would be interesting. Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com