Is there some non-deterministic resolution of Condorcet that would completely discourage insincere ranking?
Neither random ballot nor random candidate does the job, but how about some probabilities based on how close a candidate is to being a CW, or something like that? If we found a non-deterministic resolution that worked well, then we could simulate it with deterministic chaos, so that the results would be repeatable (i.e. checkable). Forest On Thu, 20 Mar 2003, [iso-8859-1] Kevin Venzke wrote: > Could I get some opinions on what resolution methods > are most free of incentive to rank insincerely, or run > clones, even if the results are "inferior"? > > Smith//RandomBallot seems to encourage (however > slightly) up-ranking compromise candidates. > > Smith//RandomCandidate isn't clone-proof. > > Smith//MMPO is something I want to think about. I was > also thinking about a kind of Smith//Bucklin, but that > would suggest up-ranking compromises, too. The > results might be decent, though. > > What if the winner of the strongest (WV) defeat > against a Smith member were made the winner? > > This example was discussed awhile ago: > 49 Bush > 24 Gore > 27 Nader>Gore > > propositions: > 51-49 Gore>Bush > 49-27 Bush>Nader > 27-24 Nader>Gore > > RP(margins) elects Bush; RP(wv) elects Gore. Are > there other (simpler) methods which necessarily elect > Gore? "Most Votes In Any Contest" elects Gore. I > believe "Plain Condorcet" elects Gore. > > Kevin Venzke > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > ___________________________________________________________ > Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français ! > Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com > _______________________________________________ > Election-methods mailing list > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com