Forest Simmons wrote: > > I read the interesting paper referenced below, but couldn't tell which of > Duverger's observations is supposed to be "Duverger's Law." > > Is it just that a first past the post lone mark single ballot system tends > to keep a two party system entrenched?
That's my understanding. The site where I fould the link made the point that Duverger himself didn't coin the term "Duverger's Law", so that it probably wouldn't do to search for an exact definition in Duverger's writing. > Here in the USA the two party system has degenerated into more of a one > party system, with superficial cosmetic differences. Is this also a > natural consequence of the voting system? Has anybody written on the > dynamics that lead to one party systems? I've seen the observation in a lot of places, but there are apparently plenty of people out there who think the differences are anything but cosmetic. Otherwise, why would anyone care who won Florida? Part of the problem may be that a two party system only permits a one-dimensional issue space (i.e. liberal vs. conservative). So long as your own views can be translated to a position on this single axis, the choice will seem material. Issues which translate to "neutral" on the lone axis will tend to be ignored, or at least have no direct effect on the outcome. Although I think candidates tend to use these to fine-tune their campaign strategies. The one-dimensional universe seems to be the most stable under the current system. A zero-dimensional, one-party system would invite opposition, while a multi-dimensional system collapses down to one. Although zero dimensions would be stable under a strict dictatorship. I wonder if there is a voting system where exactly two or three dimensions are stable? I assume Approval or Condorcet would permit n-dimensions, but I wonder about the value of n. Maybe n would be infinite, but with some dimensions "larger" than others. The realities of campaign finance and public attention might limit the value of n, or make it subject to factors other than the voting system. For example, liberal public financing might increase n, while strict limits on campaign advertising might force a fixed number of dimensions to have equal weight (I'm not saying either of these are good or bad). Bart > It seems to be a corollary to Duverger's Law. The two parties that > survive Duverger's Law compete for the perceived median voter position on > superficial matters while both strive to maximize satisfaction for their > capitalist backers. [The same big money donors support both parties in > order to hedge their bets when the races are close.] > > In other words, it's no accident that Gore and Bush were running neck and > neck in the last presidential race. The big money wants to reinforce > Duverger's Law to make sure that whichever of the two parties wins, it's > going to support corporate welfare. > > Forest > > On Mon, 24 Feb 2003, Bart Ingles wrote: > > > > > Just to further muddy the waters on the definition of "majority", note > > Duverger's use of the term as apparently synonymous with "plurality": > > http://www.janda.org/c24/Readings/Duverger/Duverger.htm > > > > (BTW the "two-ballot majority system" Duverger discusses is NOT the > > Runoff method, since there is no fixed elimination rule. ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info