Chris Benham: Yes, completely different.On Thu, 3 Apr 2003, Chris Benham wrote:--__--__-- From: "Alex Small" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> On Thu, 3 Apr 2003, Chris Benham wrote:Forest, My answer to your question "Is there a simpler method that factors allof the strategy away from the rankings or ratings of the candidates?" is yes. Voters can rank and also Approve whichever candidates they please, not even neccessarily Approving the candidate they rank as number1. The method is to have an IRV-like count, except that the candidates who are in turn eliminated are those who are the least Approved. For example, in a 3 candidate race in which you doubt that Favourite can beat Worst in a runoff, you might number the candidates 1. Favourite 2. Middle 3. Worst , but only Approve Middle .Is this any different from Approval Runoff, where you eliminate all but the two most approved candidates in the first round, and the second round is a single pairwise contest?
Chris Benham: I don't see how you can, but in this case we also have the candidates ranked in order of preference information.I ask because you say "the candidates who are eliminated in turn...", which (to me) implies a sequential process. I'm trying to see how you can get a sequential process only using approval information.
C.B: "With adequate polling data" plain Approval and even Plurality are ok in this respect.It seems like the key insight needed for Strong FBC is that Strong FBC can only be satisfied when rankings are only used to resolve a single 2-candidate contest. So, if we use a rated method to eliminate all but 2 candidates, we can then use the rankings without any incentive to rank insincerely. One interesting thing about Approval Runoff is that strategically it satisfies the Majority Criterion: When there is a candidate whom a majority of the voters consider their first choice then he should win. With adequate polling data, the majority will be aware of one another, and they'll approve only their favorite. He's guaranteed to be one of the top 2, and he'll also automatically win the pairwise contest.
C.B: This version of Approval Runoff is hopeless. If each of the competitive parties fields only one candidate,One possible downside: The largest single organized group of voters (not necessarily a majority, nor a group that has a common favorite) can guarantee a candidate's victory by only approving him and a freak. If their favorite is a serious candidate he'll automatically beat the freak in a pairwise contest.
then the first round will be dominated by strategy. Voters who want to maximise the chances of their favourite
will approve their favourite plus candidates that they think their favourite can beat (as in your example).
Voters who think that their favourite can't win and whose main concern is to stop Worst, will approve only those
acceptable candidates who they think can beat Worst, not neccessarily including their favourite.
If a party thinks that it can win the first round, then it can just field two candidates.
Chris Benham
Alex --__--__-- _______________________________________________ Election-methods mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com End of Election-methods Digest