> In a reply to Markus I spoke of minimizing need for insincerity.
> When I say that I want criteria that measure how well a method
> minimizes need for insincerity, I mean that I'd like to
> minimize the degree of insincerity needed, and it would be good
> for that protection to extend to as many voters in as many
> situations as possible.
What these criteria generally represent is the belief that voting a
less liked alternative over a more liked alternative is an extreme
unacceptable strategy, but that voting two candidates as equal when
this is not your belief is hardly a problem at all.
The natural result of this way of thinking is that approval is a
great method. In approval, it is rarely practical to vote a less
liked candidate over a more liked one. Of course, voting a less
liked candidate equal to a more liked candidate is inevitable, but as
I say, Mike tends to view this as a trifling matter.
Of course, in approval you may theoretically have a reason to vote a
less over a more liked. However, there is never a reason to give an
approval to your least favourite, or to withhold it from your
favourite. So, Mike sees strategies that might defeat the favourite
candidate as the worst possible. Equal ranking that can have this
effect is unworthy of comment. Order-reversal that does not have
this effect is unworthy of comment. But this kind of strategy is
unforgiveable.
Now, I think that a reasonable test would take all these strategies
and choice limitations into consideration. That way, a method with a
lot of the strategies Mike ignores wouldn't necessarily be considered
better than a method with a little of the strategy Mike is concerned
with. However, criteria like SARC are an all or nothing affair, and
punish one kind of order-reversal with failure, and accept any amount
of equal ranking.
---
Blake Cretney
