Mike O wrote:
-snip-
> Approval is a remarkably good voting system, in terms of the
> criteria that it meets. It meets one of the strategy criteria
> that Condorcet meets, which is met by few if any methods other
> than Approval, Condorcet & Bucklin:
>
> If a majority of all the voters prefer A to B, then they
> should have a way of voting that will ensure that B won't
> win, without any of them having to vote a less-liked candidate
> over a more-liked candidate.
>
> That criterion has been named Weak Defensive Strategy Criterion
> (WDSC). But it should perhaps be renamed more descriptively; maybe
> something like Defensive Order-Reversal Criterion, though
> I'm looking for one with a better acronym. Maybe "Drastic Defensive
> Strategy Criterion" (DDSC).
I suggest "Non-Drastic Defense criterion" (NDDC), since it means
that the defenders don't need to vote the compromise ahead of
their favorite.
And I suggest replacing the name Strong DSC with "Minimal
Defense" criterion (MDC), since the defenders don't need to rank
the compromise equal to their favorite, since they can simply
(down)rank B no better than any alternative less preferred than
B which might cycle with A. (For instance, a voter having the
preferences C>A>B>D could vote C>A>B=D if D might cycle with A.)
I'll take a moment to add that when Mike refers to "Condorcet"
above, he's referring to more than one of the better Condorcet
variations.
---Steve (Steve Eppley [EMAIL PROTECTED])
