I've talked about the lesser-of-2-evils problem. For me, and for many others, that problem is the reason why we want a better voting system. We therefore have no use for a method that doesn't improve on Plurality in regards to that problem. How do other methods do? Let me mention again two websites where you'll find information about that: http://www.electionmethods.org http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/sing.html But let me say a little here: Approval is a briefly-defined method: It's the same as our current Plurality method, except that voters may vote for more than 1 candidate if the so wish, and, when they do, they give one whole vote to each candidate for whom they vote. As now, the candidate with the most votes wins. Approval makes some important lesser-of-2-evils guarantees that IRV can't make: With Approval, no one ever has any need to vote anyone else over his favorite. I've shown how common that need will be with IRV. With Approval, everyone can always fully vote for their favorite, every time. With Condorcet's method (defined at the websites) there are common , probably typical, conditions under which no one need consider any kind of strategy, but can sincerely rank as many candidates as they want to. That of course stands in stark contrast to IRV, with which it will be common for voters to need to rank someone else over their favorite. The above 2 paragraphs are about the criteria called FBC, SFC, & GSFC, at the websites. There are other criteria too, relating to the lesser-of-2-evils problem. Those criteria are defined at the websites. They're SARC, UUCC, WDSC, & SDSC. IRV fails all of them. Approval and Condorcet each pass some important ones, of those criteria. I shouldn't lengthen this letter by defining those criteria, so I'll just refer you to the website. Let me just add that I consider WDSC my basic minimum requirement for an adequate method. Approval & Condorcet comply with WDSC. IRV fails WDSC. In conclusion, when we ask what we want from a voting system, and put it in precise terms, ass precise yes/no tests, we find that IRV fails every one of those tests--if we care about the lesser-of-2-evils problem or majority rule. Mike Ossipoff _________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com. Share information about yourself, create your own public profile at http://profiles.msn.com.
