At 19:02 00.09.13 -0400 Wednesday, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >Mr. Carey wrote- > >Mike Ossipoff has been writing about reducing/minimizing the >"need for insincerity". ... >D- In the single winner case, the sincere/ insincere situation happens when >there is (guess what)- a divided majority. > >Polls before the election show *roughly* a *sincere* possible vote of > >26 ABC >25 BAC >49 C[A=B] > >Some of the C voters may want to be insincere and rank A > B or B > A. > >Some of the first choice A and B voters may then want to be insincere. Not so >amazing. > >I say so what. Majority rule is majority rule. This is more a comment on a method finding the wrong winners, I suppose, than on sincerity-like properties. The majority rule is a rule is not desirable since it says there should be 1 winner in all elections where it is specified that there be 0 winners. It is discredited. There is no respectability to the majority rule because it is a rule that fails in 1 candidate elections. Other rules manage to survive tests up to 2 or 3 candidate elections. So it is not a bit bad. To fix the rule, it can be said that the candidate with more than 1 -------- 1 + NW of the total votes, must win. NW = the number of winners. If it is a good method, it may satisfy the duality rule. FPTP does, and so does my IFPP: The winner of the above election is the loser of this: -26 ABC -25 BAC -49 C[A=B] Using the fixed majority rule, any candidate with over 1/3 of the total of the votes wins. Hence both A and B win since they have 1st preference votes -26 and -25, which is greater than -(33+1/3). Hence C lose the election example that Demorep1 gave. If something else wins Demorep's example, then the method could be a bad method. Demorep wrote "Some of the C voters may want to be insincere and rank A > B or B > A.". If they do that, it seems from the above that it ought not make any difference. I got another example privately that has 2 of the 3 canidates over the 1/3 quota for losers. I have yet to look at that. > >My standard mantra- an election method works on the votes cast (not added or >removed votes -- unless some major felonies are being committed). > The standard mantra is wrong. >To get ONLY *sincere* votes would require something like lie detectors >connected to the (now no longer secret) ballots. No thanks. ((Demorep has a definition of his own. Can the data test methods (i.e. formulae returning a set (of winners), and receiving a vector representing ballot paper counts, ?.))